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The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces:

A Pilot Study

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Project 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for Education and Training for the Tactical Commander (PG 2, Land Command).

In conducting the research described in this report, the investigators adhered to the policies and procedures set out in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical conduct for research involving humans, National Council on Ethics in Human Research, Ottawa, 1998 as issued jointly by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Abstract

The Canadian Forces (CF) is adopting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to operations (i.e., joint, interagency, multinational, public, or JIMP). Of the JIMP dimensions, the "public" aspects, which include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may pose some of the greatest challenges in terms of interacting with non-military players. While many theories regarding these tensions exist, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective, and few studies have examined the potentially positive aspects of the military-NGO relationship. The purpose of this pilot study was to begin to explore the perspectives of NGO workers and CF members on the relationship between NGOs and the CF, in particular as it pertains to their collaboration in theatre. Participants included 5 members of NGOs, 5 CF members and one additional Subject Matter Expert (SME) for a total of 11 participants. Interviews were each approximately 2 hours in length, were tape recorded (with consent) using digital recording equipment, and subsequently transcribed. Content analysis was conducted using conventional qualitative data-analytical tools and techniques. Specifically, NVivo8, a qualitative research software package, was used to identify and categorize themes and issues pertaining to specific interview questions as well as themes and issues that emerged from the interviews. Main themes which emerged from the data include: participant perceptions of the relationship between the CF and NGOs; the role and direction that Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) should be taking; the importance of managing optics; differences in organizational culture and structure; the lack of trust between the two organizations; and recommendations for training and education. Findings show that despite organizational differences, as well as concerns with trust and image and a lack of institutional support, participants from both organizations acknowledge that the NGO and CF relationship is in many cases inevitable, in some cases a necessity, and often, already in place and working effectively through both formal and informal means. Some of the recommendations made include: the further development of CIMIC; the use of joint training, education and conferences for NGOs and the CF as a means of fostering exposure and functional relationships; and the assessment of CF cultural competence.

Résumé

Les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont décidé d'adopter une approche plus coordonnée et mieux intégrée pour la gestion des opérations (cadre interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public, ou IIMP). L'aspect « public » du cadre IIMP, qui comprend les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), risque de créer de sérieux problèmes aux FC en termes d'interaction avec les joueurs non militaires. Bien qu'il existe de nombreuses théories à ce sujet, peu d'études ont examiné la question à fond dans une perspective canadienne, et peu d'études ont examiné les aspects potentiellement positifs de la relation FC-ONG. Le but de la présente étude pilote était de commencer à explorer le point de vue des employés des ONG, et celui des membres des FC, sur la relation FC-ONG, notamment en ce qui concerne leur collaboration dans les théâtres d'opérations. Ont participé à l'étude : 5 représentants des ONG, 5 membres des FC et un spécialiste du domaine, pour un total de 11 participants. Les entrevues ont duré environ deux heures chacune, elles ont été enregistrées (avec le consentement des intéressés) au moyen d'équipements numériques, et elles ont fait l'objet d'une transcription par la suite. Le contenu a été analysé au moyen d'outils et de techniques conventionnelles d'analyse des données qualitatives. En particulier, NVivo8, un logiciel de recherche qualitative, a été utilisé pour identifier et catégoriser les thèmes et les sujets abordés dans certaines questions d'entrevue, ainsi que les thèmes et les sujets qui ont émergé pendant les entrevues. Les principaux thèmes qui ont émergé pendant les entrevues sont les suivants : la perception par les participants de la relation FC-ONG; le rôle de la coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM) et l'orientation qu'il faudrait lui donner; l'importance de gérer les différentes optiques; les différences de culture et de structure organisationnelle; le manque de confiance entre les FC et les ONG; et diverses recommandations relatives à la formation et à l'éducation. Les conclusions de l'étude montrent que malgré les différences de structure organisationnelle, les inquiétudes suscitées par le manque de confiance et l'absence de soutien institutionnel, les représentants des ONG et des FC reconnaissent que la relation FC-ONG est dans bien des cas inévitable, parfois nécessaire, et souvent déjà en place et parfaitement efficace, grâce à des moyens formels et informels. Voici certaines des recommandations qui ont été formulées dans le cadre de l'étude : développer davantage la COCIM; recourir à des séances de formation/éducation et à des conférences pour promouvoir les relations fonctionnelles entre les ONG et les FC; et évaluer les compétences culturelles des FC.

Executive summary

The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces: A Pilot Study

Tara L. Holton; Angela R. Febbraro; Emily-Ana Filardo; Marissa Barnes; Brenda Fraser; Rachel Spiece; DRDC Toronto TR 2009-198; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; September 2010.

Introduction or background: The Canadian Forces (CF) is adopting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to operations (i.e., joint, interagency, multinational, public, or JIMP). Furthermore, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Doctrine as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment[1]. Of the JIMP dimensions, the "public" aspects, which include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may pose some of the greatest challenges for the CF in terms of interacting with nonmilitary players. As a result of the need to better understand the "public" aspect of JIMP, the Applied Research Project (ARP), entitled "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander," was developed at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto. The present report summarizes a pilot study that supports this ARP, specifically in terms of addressing the quality and nature of the relationship between the CF and NGOs. Thus, this study explored the challenges or tensions that exist between these two groups, including but not limited to tensions pertaining to organizational structure and culture, stereotypes and assumptions, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, control of resources, definitions of success and time frames, and information control and sharing. In addition, the study explored the positive aspects, or strengths, that characterize relationships between the CF and NGOs.

Results: Analysis of 11 interviews with 5 members of the CF, 5 members of NGOs and 1 additional Subject Matter Expert (SME) revealed six main themes including: the benefits of the relationship between the CF and NGOs; the role and direction that Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) should be taking; the importance of managing optics; differences in organizational culture and structure; the lack of trust between the two organizations; and recommendations for training and education. Findings show that despite organizational differences, as well as concerns with trust and image and a lack of institutional support, participants from both organizations acknowledge that the NGO and CF relationship is in many cases inevitable, beneficial, necessary, and often, already in place and working through both formal and informal means. These results are in keeping with the current literature which suggests that the existence of the 'humanitarian space' is in question and is shrinking to be replaced by a hybrid, shared space which is uncoordinated, changing, and at times made up of conflicting positions[2].

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[1] Gizewski, P., & Rostek, M. (2007). Toward a JIMP-capable land force. *Canadian Army Journal, 10* (1), 55-72.

[2] Monaghan, S. (2007). Conclusion: Connecting theory and practice. In S.J. Meharg (Ed.), *Helping hands and loaded arms: Navigating the military and humanitarian space.* Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

Significance: Although the description of the interaction discussed by participants is not what one might consider a traditional relationship, and not entirely in keeping with the fully integrated model espoused by JIMP, the development of this relationship is perhaps the best answer to the growing, diversifying and increasingly complex needs of today's security operations. Some of the recommendations made include: the further development of CIMIC; the use of joint training, education and conferences for NGOs and the CF as a means of fostering exposure and functional relationships; and the assessment of CF cultural competence.

Future plans: Given that this is a pilot study, a larger study building upon this pilot study, with a broader participant base, is recommended. The participant list should be expanded to include a full complement of the players that would allow for the 'bigger picture' and that would further the understanding of the dynamics in theatre. Suggested organizations from which to draw participants include a broader range of NGOs, international organizations (IOs), as well as other government departments (OGDs), such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), paid contractors, and other development groups all of which are involved in the theatre of operations. Within the CF, a broader net should be cast to encompass members from all branches of the military, but in particular, a variety of individuals who have worked in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), as well as CIMIC. Understanding which issues of CF organizational culture are systemic and which are localized will help in mapping what happens when others interact with the CF and may lead to the development of more effective training.

Sommaire

La relation entre les organisations non-gouvernementales et les Forces canadiennes: Une étude pilote

Tara L. Holton; Angela R. Febbraro; Emily-Ana Filardo; Marissa Barnes; Brenda Fraser; Rachel Spiece; DRDC Toronto TR 2009-198; R & D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; Septembre 2010.

Introduction ou contexte : Les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont décidé d'adopter une approche plus coordonnée et plus intégrée en ce qui concerne les opérations (cadre interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public, ou IIMP). De plus, pour le Directeur – Concepts et doctrine de la Force terrestre, la capacité de fonctionner à l'intérieur du cadre IIMP est une exigence importante de l'Armée de terre de demain, et un moyen essentiel de garantir le succès des missions dans un environnement terrestre de plus en plus complexe[3]. L'aspect « public » du cadre IIMP, qui comprend les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), risque de créer de sérieux problèmes aux FC en termes d'interaction avec les joueurs non militaires. Parce qu'il était nécessaire de mieux comprendre l'aspect « public » du cadre IIMP, le projet de recherche appliquée intitulé « JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander » a été mis sur pied à Recherche et développement pour la Défense (RDDC) Toronto. La présente étude pilote a été réalisée pour appuyer ce projet, et elle a porté en particulier sur la nature et la qualité de la relation FC-ONG. Par conséquent, elle a examiné les problèmes et les tensions qui existent entre les FC et les ONG, y compris dans les domaines suivants (liste non limitative) : culture et structure organisationnelle; stéréotypes et préjugés; tâches et méthodes de travail; contrôle des ressources; définitions du succès et échéances; contrôle et partage de l'information. De plus, l'étude a examiné les aspects positifs, ou les points forts, des relations entre les FC et les ONG.

Résultats : Des entrevues ont été réalisées avec 11 participants, soit 5 représentants des ONG, 5 membres des FC et un spécialiste du domaine. Six thèmes principaux ont émergé pendant les entrevues : les avantages de la relation FC-ONG; le rôle de la coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM) et l'orientation qu'il faudrait lui donner; l'importance de gérer les différentes optiques; les différences de culture et de structure organisationnelle; le manque de confiance entre les FC et les ONG; et diverses recommandations relatives à la formation et à l'éducation. Les conclusions de l'étude montrent que malgré les différences de structure organisationnelle, les inquiétudes suscitées par le manque de confiance et l'absence de soutien institutionnel, les représentants des ONG et des FC reconnaissent que la relation FC-ONG est dans bien des cas inévitable, bénéfique, nécessaire, et souvent déjà en place et parfaitement efficace, grâce à des moyens formels et informels. Ces résultats sont conformes aux ouvrages scientifiques récents, qui disent que « l'espace humanitaire » se rétrécit et est en voie d'être remplacé par un espace

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[3] Gizewski, P., & Rostek, M. (2007). Toward a JIMP-capable land force. *Canadian Army Journal, 10* (1), 55-72.

hybride partagé qui n'est pas coordonné, qui est changeant, et dans lequel coexistent parfois des positions conflictuelles[4].

Portée : Bien que l'interaction FC-ONG décrite par les participants ne puisse pas être considérée comme une relation traditionnelle, et bien qu'elle ne soit pas pleinement conforme au modèle parfaitement intégré que propose le cadre IIMP, le développement de cette relation est peut-être la meilleure réponse aux besoins croissants, diversifiés et de plus en plus complexes des opérations de sécurité d'aujourd'hui. Voici certaines des recommandations qui ont été formulées dans le cadre de l'étude : développer davantage la COCIM; recourir à des séances de formation/éducation et à des conférences pour promouvoir les relations fonctionnelles entre les ONG et les FC; et évaluer les compétences culturelles des FC.

Recherches futures : Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une étude pilote, une nouvelle étude fondée sur les résultats de celle-ci et faisant appel à un plus grand nombre de participants est recommandée. Il faudrait élargir la liste des participants pour inclure tous les joueurs et donner une vision d'ensemble de la situation, afin de faire mieux comprendre la dynamique des interrelations dans les théâtres d'opérations. Les organisations suivantes devraient fournir des participants : un plus grand éventail d'ONG; des organisations internationales; d'autres ministères et organismes gouvernementaux comme la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC), l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), et le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI); des entrepreneurs rémunérés; et d'autres agences de développement présentes dans les théâtres d'opérations. À l'intérieur des FC, il faudrait ratisser plus large pour aller chercher des représentants de toutes les branches des forces armées, et en particulier des militaires qui ont fait partie des équipes de reconstruction provinciale (ERP), de l'Équipe d'intervention en cas de catastrophe (EICC), et des équipes de COCIM. Comprendre quels problèmes liés à la culture/structure organisationnelle des FC sont systémiques, et quels autres problèmes sont localisés, aidera à déterminer ce qui se passe lorsque d'autres joueurs interagissent avec les FC, et mènera peut-être à l'élaboration de programmes de formation plus efficaces.

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[4] Monaghan, S. (2007). Conclusion: Connecting theory and practice. In S.J. Meharg (Ed.), *Helping hands and loaded arms: Navigating the military and humanitarian space.* Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

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Acknowledgements

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1 Introduction

The Canadian Forces (CF) is adopting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to operations (i.e., joint, interagency, multinational, public, or JIMP). The capacity to be "JIMP-capable" is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Doctrine as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). Of the JIMP dimensions, the "public" aspect, which includes a variety of civilian organizations, including but not limited to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may pose some of the greatest challenges for the CF in terms of interacting with non-military players. These challenges relate to the sheer diversity of organizations and other entities included within the public aspect of JIMP; to the often significant differences between the organizational culture and values of the CF and the culture and values of various public organizations and entities; and, from the perspective of NGOs, to the concerns about physical security and neutrality that are raised when contemplating any relationship with the military in general. Thus, the challenges of the CF-NGO relationship are daunting and require further understanding.

As a result of the need to better understand the public aspect of JIMP, the Applied Research Project (ARP), entitled "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander," was developed at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto. Some of the main objectives of this ARP include: 1) a conceptual clarification of the public aspect of JIMP capability; 2) identification of individual differences/aptitudes that enable individuals to work effectively and succeed in a JIMP environment, with implications for training, selection and teamwork; and 3) integration of historical and international perspectives on the public aspect of JIMP. The present pilot study supports this ARP by exploring the relationship between the CF and NGOs through the analysis of interviews with experienced members of both communities.

The need to better understand the NGO and CF relationship has become apparent in the years since the Cold War, as the changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries increasingly taking on roles in humanitarian relief and development, a field traditionally belonging to civilian organizations. Tensions have been noted to arise when civilian and military personnel are concurrently involved in providing humanitarian aid in areas of crisis (Winslow, 2002). For example, research has explored tensions between militaries and NGOs in regard to organizational structure and culture, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, the control of resources, definitions of success and time frames, and information control and sharing (Winslow, 2002). In terms of organizational structure and culture, for instance, militaries tend to adopt hierarchical structures and decision-making cultures, whereas NGOs, although quite heterogeneous, tend to adopt flatter organizational structures and decision-making cultures. In terms of approaches to the accomplishment of tasks, militaries tend to emphasize efficient planning, whereas NGOs tend to emphasize the importance of community participation. Further, militaries tend to establish short-term goals and definitions of success (e.g., civil security), whereas NGOs tend to define success in terms of long-term social and economic development. In regard to control of resources, NGOs are sometimes concerned that the use of military resources will compromise their neutrality, which may be critical to their success and safety. On the other hand, both militaries and NGOs may have security concerns in regard to information sharing. It has also been suggested (Winslow, 2002) that these tensions may be exacerbated by stereotypes and assumptions on both sides (e.g., military members might perceive NGO workers as "flaky

do-gooders," whereas NGO members might perceive military members as "authoritarian" or "arrogant"). While many theories regarding these tensions exist, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective, and few studies have examined the potentially positive aspects of the military-NGO relationships (i.e., the strengths that may characterize these relationships or the factors that could be built upon to improve these relationships more generally). The goal of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between the CF and NGOs, in terms of both strengths and challenges, and to find ways to improve these relationships that meet the needs and goals of both groups.

1.1   Purpose of the Present Study

The purpose of this pilot study is twofold. The first is to begin to explore the perspectives of NGO workers and CF members on the relationship between NGOs and the CF, in particular as it pertains to their collaboration in theatre. The focus will be on topics that have been identified in the literature as areas of interest in the NGO and CF relationship, including but not limited to, organizational structure and culture, stereotypes and assumptions, the quality and nature of relationships, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, control of resources, definitions of success and time frames, and information control and sharing. Although the focus of previous research (e.g., Winslow, 2002) has been on exploring the tensions, challenges, or negative aspects of the military-NGO relationship, the present study will also examine potentially positive aspects, or strengths, as well. The second purpose of this pilot study is to test the interview protocol to determine whether or not the interview questions are pertinent in regard to the topics of interest, whether they resonate with the participants, and if there is anything missing from the protocol that should be included. The eventual goal of this pilot study, and of the larger ARP, will be to shed light on the current relationship between NGOs and the CF, and to determine which aspects are hindrances and which are helpful in forming an effective relationship between these two groups. Thus, this pilot study, and the larger research project, will aim to provide information and recommendations on how to develop more effective collaborative relationships between the CF and NGOs.

The structure of this report will follow the chronology of the study, beginning with the methodology, including information about the participants and their recruitment. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the interview procedure and the process of analysis. The analysis section will follow the methodology and will include a detailed, empirical analysis of themes and patterns observed in the data. This section will be descriptive in nature. The discussion section which follows the analysis section is analytical in nature and will provide an examination of what is happening in the data, drawing together related themes and observations from the analysis section. This report will conclude with recommendations based on themes and observations that emerged from the data, as well as suggestions for future research.

2 Method

2.1 Participants

Interviews for this study were conducted with 5 NGO participants, 5 CF participants and one additional Subject Matter Expert (SME) for a total of 11 participants. Participants ranged in age from 30 to 70 years, and were at varying stages in their careers. Ranks of the CF members included a Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Major and Colonel (Ret.). All were Army. The CF and NGO participants were equal number male (3 CF, 2 NGO) and female (3 NGO, 2CF). The additional SME, an expert in development-military collaboration was male. Although participants were classified as either CF, NGO, or other SME, it is important to note that some CF participants had also been members of an NGO at one time and some of the NGOs had been members of the military in their past; thus, to some extent, there was overlap among the participant categories in terms of their prior experiences. Reported ethnicity was varied, and in the participants' own words included: Canadian, Asian, Scottish, Irish, English, Hungarian, Russian, Japanese, and Palestinian. All CF participants had interacted with NGOs during their career as a CF member (e.g., as members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, and as Civil-Military Cooperation [CIMIC] officers or liaison officers) and all of the NGO participants had interacted with the military (the CF and the militaries of other countries) during their career as a member of an NGO. All participants had been deployed internationally over the course of their careers, with seven of the eleven participants having had deployment experience to Afghanistan. The range of experience amongst the participants (CF and NGO alike) varied, with those earlier in their career having had one to three deployments, while those later in their career having multiple deployments (to Afghanistan and elsewhere). Participants all reside in Canada, and all interviews took place in person or by phone across Canada, with the exception of one participant, who was in Afghanistan at the time of the interview. In all cases, participants were volunteers acquired through professional contacts and "snowball sampling" (described in more detail below).

2.2 Participant Recruitment and Interviews

Participant recruitment and interviews took place from May to August, 2009. Initial potential participants were identified through professional contacts. These individuals were sent a participant recruitment e-mail (see Annex A) informing them of the study with a request for participation. Participant recruitment e-mails were also sent to professional contacts who were not potential participants themselves, but who could pass the e-mail and information on to potential participants. Once a participant had participated in the study, snowball sampling (sometimes referred to as referral sampling or chain-referral sampling) was employed, in which the participant was asked to either forward, if they felt comfortable doing so, the names of other potential participants to the principal investigator, or to forward the recruitment e-mail on to other potential participants. In order to offset any selection bias that may result from this form of participant selection (e.g., a bias towards negative participant experiences), the interview questions focused on a diversity of both positive and negative participant experiences and perceptions.

Once participants were identified, they were sent a participant package that included an Information Letter describing the study (see Annex B), a Voluntary Consent Form (see Annex C), a short demographic questionnaire which varied slightly depending on whether or not the

participant was a CF member or a member of an NGO (see Annexes D and E, respectively), a remuneration form and a set of the interview questions, which also varied slightly depending on whether the participant was a CF member or a member of an NGO (see Annexes F and G, respectively). Packages were sent either by e-mail or Canada Post, depending on the preference of the participant. The packages sent through Canada Post included a self-addressed stamped return envelope. Participants returned the signed Voluntary Consent Form, the signed remuneration form, and the completed demographic questionnaire by Canada Post or fax, again depending on their preference or circumstances.

Interviews took place in person or by phone and employed a semi-structured format. Nine of the interviews were conducted by the Principal Investigator and two by a Co-Investigator. In-person interviews took place in private meeting rooms at DRDC Toronto while phone interviews took place in the private meeting rooms or offices of the interviewer and interviewee, with the exception of the interviewee who was in Afghanistan and who chose to participate in the interview outdoors, over a cell phone. All study methods and interview questions were reviewed and approved by the DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and participants were offered remuneration according to DRDC guidelines.

The interview questions focused on organizational structure and culture, stereotypes and assumptions, the quality and nature of relationships, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, control of resources, definitions of success and time frames, and information control and sharing. Following the policies and procedures set out in the Tri-Council Policy Statement regarding ethical conduct for research involving humans, it was emphasized to all participants that all of the data gathered from this study would be kept strictly confidential, and that under no circumstances would identifying characteristics be reported. Interviews were tape recorded (with consent) using digital recording equipment, and subsequently transcribed in house at DRDC Toronto (see Annex H for the transcription guide). Interviews were approximately 2 hours in length, each yielding approximately 50 pages of transcribed text for a total of 500 pages of data. While interview participants were asked to reflect on their experiences without providing information that directly or indirectly identified individuals, this was not always possible. As a result, interviewees were sent the full and intact transcript to note any identifying characteristics which were not immediately obvious to the research team, as well as to review for accuracy. In order to maintain the context of the interview content, transcripts were kept intact for analysis and identifying characteristics were removed at the time of report writing. To remove identifying characteristics, the standard practice of removing names of people and locations as well as dates was followed, in addition to removing any other characteristic that the interviewee indicated might identify themselves or others. The first author also removed some other characteristics that she felt may have identified the interviewee or others. In order to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of participants, the Voluntary Consent Forms, the demographic questionnaires and the remuneration forms were stored separately from the interview data in a locked cabinet.

2.3   Data Analysis

Data analysis took place from August to October 2009. Content analysis was conducted using conventional qualitative data-analytical tools and techniques to analyze the interview data. Specifically, NVivo8, a qualitative research software package created by QSR International, in Melbourne, Australia was used to identify and categorize themes and issues pertaining to specific interview questions as well as themes and issues that emerged from the interviews. Analysis involved two stages. The first involved a preliminary analysis of the data using NVivo8 in order

to determine the structure of the coding scheme. The co-authors met on two occasions to discuss and debate the coding scheme; they achieved consensus on the second meeting, resulting in a coding scheme that was imported into NVivo8 and used in the second stage of analysis. In the second stage of analysis, the first author analyzed all 11 interviews, while three of the co-authors analyzed 3 or 4 of the interviews each. The separate projects of each rater were then merged into one project. Percent agreement using the comparison query function of NVivo8 was calculated using the first author's analysis and the combination of the three co-authors' analyses. The percent agreement was calculated by taking the mean of the percent agreement for each category in the coding schema. Items imported in the merging of the four projects that would artificially influence the percent agreement were removed from the calculation. For example, each separate project contained copies of the identical interviews, which when merged would then indicate 100 percent agreement. As such, these were removed from the calculation of the percent agreement, resulting in a percent agreement of 98 percent.

3   Results

The following results pertain to the six main themes and their respective subthemes that emerged from the content analysis of the interview data. To illustrate major themes, excerpts from the interviews are presented[5]. These results outline the main barriers and facilitators to the CF and NGO relationship as well as the recommendations that emerged from the interviews.

3.1   Benefits of the NGO-CF Relationship

> "These are the challenges in working with NGOs. I can't remember one lecture where they say, this is the *benefit*." (CF)

The benefits of the relationship(s) between NGOs and the CF emerged as a prominent theme in the discourse of the participants. Speaking generally, this pattern in the discussions focused on the high level of coordination needed for success, as well as acknowledgement of a "broad security mission" for which each set of players, be they CF, NGOs or others, are responsible for some, but not all of the mission objectives. This coordinated security mission or broad mission objective is prominent in the discourse of the participants, despite widespread acknowledgement among them that this is not necessarily the approach currently endorsed by either the CF or NGOs. Nevertheless, many recognized and promoted the idea of a certain type of "team approach" as necessary to achieve success. As one CF participant who was a member of an NGO prior to joining the CF indicated:

> "I think it's advantageous on *both* sides … I think there's a lot of things that the military brings to the table and I think that there's a lot of things that NGOs bring to the table, and both parties can *benefit* from either side. I think it's imperative. I really think it's important, especially if it's – now both sides can also be harmful to the other as well, I don't want to negate that, but ultimately at the end of the day when it's working well, I think it works very, very well." (CF)

An NGO participant suggested that a successful mission is:

> "… something that has to do with what people do best. So what happens, the military secures the peace … They *are* in charge of the peace, this is good. They go in, they're supposed to secure the space, they make the space safe for civilians and for NGOs and for the UN. They should do that, and then the UN goes in, and then NGOs go in, and they're actually the implementing partners on the ground and actually do the work in the villages and what not. *That's* what a successful [mission looks like]." (NGO)

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[5] Interviews were transcribed verbatim, however, for the purposes of readability, the interview excerpts that are presented in this report have been edited slightly to enhance their readability (e.g., "um's," "uh's," were deleted, as appropriate). Further, three ellipsis points (…) within a sentence were used to indicate that material was omitted from the original interview transcript. Four ellipsis points were used to indicate any omission between two or more sentences. Square brackets were used to enclose material (additions or explanations) inserted in a quotation by the principal investigator. Words written in italics reflect emphasis that the interviewee put on a particular word.

These success stories were, however, often judged to be more dependent on the individuals involved, and as reflecting these individuals' own beliefs and personalities. Again, this is an acknowledgement that this form of partnership is not a formal process endorsed by either the CF or NGOs, but is something that occurs informally, or in small pockets where the "right" people have come together. As one CF participant who was a member of a PRT suggested:

> "And it worked well because the guy in charge defined very early what our job was. And that was to work in an interdepartmental process. So we knew from the get go that everything, you know, we sat at one big table every morning and we discussed what it was we had to do. And if *I* couldn't do it I would … point it right out and say "Could you do it?" …. And the CIDA person, if I was pointing at them would say "No, that's not within ours. Who could do this?" Somebody would put up their hand. That's a *team*. That's a *partnership* right there. *That* worked well. But if that *boss* doesn't get it …. One of the smartest things he said was 'I didn't go to PRT school, I am learning this as we go along and I'm learning from you'." (CF)

As this participant suggested, the reason for the success demonstrated in his PRT had to do with his commanding officer's endorsement of a partnership approach, one in which the commanding officer acknowledged that the partnership promoted in a PRT setting was novel and something which everyone at the table could contribute to in an equal manner. This participant mentioned later in the interview that approaches such as that taken by his commanding officer are not the norm, but have lead to successful outcomes, more so he feels, than a more traditional military-centric approach to working with the public.

While every participant acknowledged that some level of partnership was necessary for success in the complex missions faced by both the CF and NGOs, the form that any type of partnership would take was, not surprisingly, a very contentious issue. For reasons of optics, mandates, doctrines and safety, participants, both CF and NGO, recognized that a partnership could be harmful to both the CF and NGOs. This is represented in the participants' struggle to define what such a partnership would look like. Some participants feel that integration is a necessary but painful approach to military and NGOs working together:

> "It's got to be integration, to really get hybrid vigour you need integration, but integration *hurts* … If you move to an integration model, you move from assimilation or cohabitation to integration, what you get is a situation where *you* need to change some of what you are basing your life on in order to be able to interact well with others." (SME)

The same participant quoted above felt that integration of CF and NGOs in theatre would necessarily involve a fundamental change in identity[6] on behalf of both NGOs and CF members, making it a process of change that both groups would be likely to resist. Others, both CF and NGO, felt that while partnership at a certain level is necessary, an arms-length approach is more appropriate, one where communication is still needed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is safety:

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[6] In this context and for the purposes of this report, identity is defined as "sense of self, of personhood, constructed in relation to sameness and difference from others and derived from individual characteristics such as gender or ethnicity, for example, that can be relatively durable, as well as identities developed through a process of "construction" influenced by cultural characteristics such as norms, beliefs, values, traditions, organization, sub-groups which may be relatively fluid over a lifetime." (Davis, 2009).

"Integration is scary to people…that's what we've faced. I think integration and coordination means…that someone has to be in charge and the NGOs are afraid that military will be the ones in charge …. Coordination and integration absolutely not, 'cause it means one has to be swallowed by the other." (NGO)

"I think one of the things that needs to be done is *coordination* between them. NGOs should know as much as they can within the bounds of security so they don't get in the way they, and most of them don't want to get in the way, and so they can assess any potential impact on their operations. And the Canadian Forces wants to know where they are and what they're doing so that they don't accidentally stalk them, mistake them for somebody else." (CF)

"A higher level example of that requirement to coordinate, is, for example, using the roads from Pakistan into Afghanistan for the movement of bulk supplies for the international military forces, fuel and stuff, has become very dangerous. So a lot of stuff has been lost and blown up. So now, a lot of that stuff is coming in from the north, through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and stuff like that. So now, there are large military convoys moving through, on the roads, in provinces where they did *not* until very recently. Like, I'm talking weeks. Well that in turn has attracted, the bad guys' attention 'cause these are big fat dumb happy targets, right? So now there's insurgent activity in some areas where there wasn't before. NGOs that have been working up there, basically living among the people and villages and towns, now have to take security measures that they didn't have to take before." (CF).

While the form of partnership is still up for debate, the necessity and benefits of communication, one way or another, for mission success was accepted by NGO and CF participants alike:

"There's so much corruption in a failed state and, to go in and have everybody working in their own stovepipe, I mean, that's not going to achieve anybody's mission and we all have to be talking to one another. And it doesn't have to be visible that you're talking to one another, but it has to happen. People don't need to know that we're all talking to one another. I think people need to seek out and understand what the other's mission is, and not to be afraid and to look past perceptions you may have negative or otherwise, and work with whatever means you need to accomplish the mission. 'Cause in the end everybody's there to accomplish the same mission." (CF)

As a whole, the participant interviews reported the quality and type of the CF-NGO relationship to be varied and dependent on the personality of the individuals involved, however, the necessity and benefit of partnership in one form or another was recognized as not only something that is needed for mission success, but as something that is already in place, both formally and informally. While some participants want the two groups to have as little contact as possible, and others want a fully integrated partnership, they all agreed that the CF and NGOs "don't function separately on their own anyway" (NGO participant). The issue then becomes one of addressing the variety of challenges that both the military and NGOs face in establishing a working relationship. For some this may mean a form of coordination that maintains the neutrality of NGOs, while for others an integration model would be the desired approach.

3.2   CIMIC's Role

CIMIC's role in the NGO and CF relationship emerged as one discussed primarily by CF members, due simply to the fact that some of the NGO participants were not familiar with CIMIC. CIMIC is a function of the Land Force that involves working in civil-military cooperation. CIMIC officers support the mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the CF and civilians in theatre. A CIMIC officer is likely the first point of contact between the CF and any given NGO. CIMIC is understood by participants as an essential enabler/facilitator, but currently is viewed with frustration. CIMIC is seen as a "work in progress," as operating not at its full potential, but as being partially limited by lack of career progression for CIMIC operators. As one participant from the Canadian Forces indicated:

> "We are so far ahead of the military curve in influence activities and civil military cooperation. People don't know what to do with us. And it's because nobody has, there isn't a career path for a civil military operator." (CF)

At present, there is no permanent full-time capacity within the CF that facilitates the integrated philosophy espoused by JIMP. Participants feel that CIMIC is necessary to allow the CF to become JIMP capable, but that although developing, CIMIC has not been given significant priority within the CF. Ten years ago, the Army Lessons Learned Centre emphasized that CIMIC is "an important piece of the military efficiency puzzle and will undoubtedly be part of every mission …" yet then as now, it was acknowledged as an "area that to date has been largely ignored" (Department of National Defence, 1999). Indeed, even within the CF, the role of CIMIC is not well understood, although participants acknowledged that this is changing:

> "CIMIC, a lot of people in the military *don't* understand what it is or what it does, or how it can help. And so, you know, you're talking about how NGOs don't understand the military, but within our military, they don't understand what CIMIC is. So, there's like a double whammy there." (CF)

> "It's developing best it can, I guess, is the best way to put it. The tempo is high … It's changed, I've seen it change from beginning to now and I have to admit there's been some amazing changes, and for the better. I mean they've tried a lot of different things, you know it's a new organization with growing pains as well. But I think what it's produced overall is pretty phenomenal, from the days of, yeah we're not really sure what we're doing, to yeah, okay, these are your mandates, and more and more people within the CF even are beginning to understand what our role is, whereas before they had no idea." (CF)

One of the main concerns that participants had regarding CIMIC was the selection of individuals, that is, finding the "right" person for the job. When asked if they felt that the "right" person could be trained for the position, most participants felt that a combination of innate characteristics, coupled with the appropriate training, would yield individuals with the "right" qualities. Participants felt that in order to make CIMIC an effective enabler and facilitator, proper selection and extensive training prior to pre-deployment training is necessary:

> "Yeah you need it … you're just parachuting guys out of the blue and they're just going to ad hoc it. And they're not going to have that relationship through their network with other agencies. And once you hit the ground, it's going to show." (CF)

"They're recruiting guys … a reservist [working at a] warehouse, for example, and he's put as the advisor with CIMIC, at the PRT, to brief CIDA and DFAIT. And those guys are parachuted in. Their 6-month training ends up being overwhelmed on Afghanistan and not necessarily on the overall campaign plan." (CF)

"So, they're not getting a guy who went to school, has an interest, has already background knowledge …" (CF)

While most of the CF participants indicated that CIMIC is an important component of a coordinated and comprehensive approach, they were dissatisfied with the current state of CIMIC due to the lack of career path and lack of emphasis on recruiting the right people for the positions. Participants (mostly CF) suggested that CIMIC is an integral part of a successful mission and should be acknowledged as such, even going as far as to suggest that the philosophy behind the missions needs to be changed, from one in which the focus is on kinetic activity, to one in which the focus is on civil military operations:

"I believe in our capability. I *believe* in what it is that we can achieve. Just as I mentioned before, if we go into a country with the mindset that we are going to support civil military operations with kinetic activity, instead of support kinetic activity with civil military operations, I believe that's how we'll be successful." (CF)

A full-time permanent career path for CIMIC officers, coupled with increased awareness both within and outside of the CF regarding the role and importance of CIMIC, is described by many participants as essential to the success of PRTs and to bridging the gap in the relationship between the CF and NGOs. The feeling amongst many of the study participants was that CIMIC *is* the path to mission success.

3.3   Managing Optics

3.3.1   NGO Image

Optics or image emerged as a subject of great importance in the discourse of participants, one which was linked to mission success, funding, security and the tense relationship between the CF (or the military in general) and NGOs. It is well known that the image of NGOs, in particular, requires a delicate balance: For an NGO, maintaining an image of neutrality is akin to mission success, security and the integrity of their mandates. As found in previous studies (e.g., Winslow, 2002), NGO participants indicated that their neutrality has been compromised by the increased presence of the military in humanitarian space, and that this has caused further discord between NGOs and the military in general. Several of the NGO participants indicated that to be seen as cooperating with the military allows NGOs to be perceived as aligned with them by both

belligerents and beneficiaries alike, simultaneously risking the security of the NGO members, and losing the trust of the local population[7]. As one NGO participant indicated:

> "I think NGOs *may* feel in general that the military has overstepped their mandate, as I said at the beginning, and have made things a lot more difficult for humanitarians and humanitarian assistance and international development. And I think that has *probably* produced a *little* bit of resentment on the NGO side, who those of us who used to travel *very* easily and *very* safely in many, many countries. Partly as a result of military, *not solely* as a result of mixing up the mandates, *but partly* as a result of mixing up the mandates, you know, we are no longer safe almost *anywhere* [in high-conflict places]." (NGO)

Furthermore, the issue of sharing resources or information, which would imply a partnership in some form, remained for some NGO participants an impossibility, primarily due to the fallout from the optics of the situation, as stated by this NGO member:

> "I think from an NGO standpoint, from my perspective, I'd be wondering how is it going to look that they're sharing resources with the Canadian Forces…because your reputation is very important and it can be … NGOs spend a lot of time building up trust with people in the communities and their reputation is a very, very delicate and valuable thing. So that, for me, I would be wondering, yeah it would be great to share resources and we could gain a lot from it but how is that going to look?" (NGO)

Interestingly, and in keeping with the earlier comment that NGOs and the CF rarely function independently in a conflict zone, some participants suggested that the perception of NGO independence was more important than the reality. Participants, both NGO and CF, suggested that CF and NGO contact could be possible without compromising NGO neutrality. Several of the CIMIC officers indicated this as something that they had facilitated in the past, or were willing to facilitate in the future. As the following two CIMIC officers suggested:

> "I was very cognizant in Afghanistan that if a military vehicle was in front of an NGO building, it *made* that NGO building a target now for insurgent activities. So quite often I would hire local liaison officers to deal with that agency. Give us that one degree of separation so that, you know, the optics weren't there." (CF)

> "I don't wanna know where you're going on a day-to-day basis, but if you can tell me where you're operating, I can avoid going there to jeopardize your neutrality. Okay. I don't want to go anywhere where you are. I want to stay *clear* of it. It's a no-go area actually but if you don't tell me where you're operating or what's your activities or your objectives, well then I can't guarantee that we're not going to come across each other. I

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[7] Interestingly however, most participants also noted that CF and NGO collaboration would likely not affect how NGOs are perceived by the beneficiaries of aid, who, rightly so, are more concerned with the aid, than with those who are delivering the aid. Participants noted that in some circumstances, beneficiaries of aid may not differentiate between the different groups who are delivering the aid.

can almost guarantee we will. So it's to *their* benefit to remain neutral and transparent …" (CF)

Thus, these participants suggested that some form of coordination or agreement, which would need to be communicated, may actually help facilitate NGO neutrality, potentially increasing NGO security. The additional SME also supported this view of a delicate balance being needed for the NGO-CF relationship, suggesting that information sharing is essential to the success of both groups, and to mission success:

> "NGOs, particularly your small-scale ones who have been in an environment for a long time, know a lot about what's going on in the black box of the society and how things work, who are the formal and informal leaders that you need to pay attention to, that you need to work with. In other words they understand the human geography of the environment, and the military comes in often without that information and needs to *get* it. However, if the NGO is trying to maintain the humanitarian space [but] if it gives all of its intels to the military it's basically screwing itself. And so there's a problem there. The NGOs need the security information that the military has so that they don't inadvertently wind up getting kidnapped or killed or whatever. So information sharing is an absolute essential, particularly in environments where you're in [high conflict]." (SME)

While most participants felt that, for many NGOs, neutrality must be maintained for reasons of security and impartiality, they also acknowledged the need for communication in some form between NGOs and the CF, and indeed, that such communication already takes place in certain circumstances between certain groups in theatre. NGO neutrality was not considered compromised simply through contact, but specifically through overt partnership in an area of high conflict. In other words, context made all of the difference in situations like these, where NGO participants had no problem being seen as cooperating and partnering with the CF during natural disasters, as stated by this NGO member and CIMIC officer, respectively:

> "So I think that context is everything. Whereas if you're post-tsunami, you know, no one's looking to bomb anyone so it makes sense that you would share equipment, you would share information. It makes sense. Or even in a post-conflict setting." (NGO)

> "An emergency situation it's not as politically charged. It's life or death situation, lets get in and get these people what they need. And it's easier to work together. In an *insurgency*, you are assigned … Nobody's neutral." (CF)

While optics remains an issue of delicate balance in forging a relationship (if any) in high - conflict areas, where the military is understood to be a party to the conflict, other contexts, where neutrality is not an issue (such as natural disasters) pose a situation in which partnership is a desirable means of mission success.

3.3.2   CF Image

The image of the CF was also raised as a factor in mission success and in regard to the effectiveness of the relationship between the CF and NGOs. Several participants, CF and NGO alike, suggested that were the CF to market itself better, both at home and in theatre, it would improve the safety of CF personnel and those associated with them, as well as shed light on

misconceptions, or ameliorate the understanding of what exactly the CF, and in particular CIMIC, does in general. As mentioned by the following participants:

> "I think we have to be better at marketing ourselves and I think not just outside to the general public and NGOs, but also within to the military. But we have to be better at marketing ourselves so that people understand what it's all about and what the benefits are." (CF)

> "It is a total blind spot. Total blind spot. Part of the military is responsible for a piece of this. The military does not portray itself *adequately* as anything other than weapons carriers. *Or* emergency do-gooders like the Winnipeg flood and shoveling snow in Toronto and stuff like that." (SME)

> "I think that *my* impression is that there's not a lot of understanding about *what* the Canadian Forces do. And a lot of the awareness that we get might come from the media, and it would be worthwhile to maybe get information directly from the Canadian Forces or *have* some kind of a dialogue. Instead of news clips or what might be seen as propaganda type kind of thing." (NGO)

One CIMIC officer recounted a situation where "branding" of the CF, specifically of individuals and vehicles associated with PRTs, resulted in a favourable response from the locals, by aligning the PRT with humanitarian aid:

> "The PRT, within Afghanistan, has a brand. People know what the PRT is. We wore a big PRT badge. He [Commanding Officer] wanted to put PRT on all of our trucks. We're branded. So if we're branded as the guys who are building the wells – well, that's a terrible one, it's so stereotypical. But we're the ones who can fund, you know, a project that'll help with the irrigation in battle-damaged areas. Oh, those are pretty good guys. You know, we would travel in three lightly armored vehicles. Three. With *eight* people. We never got shot at, nobody ever tried to blow us up. Everybody else is in LAVs [Light Armored Vehicle] and the big Nyalas and all that and, you know, we were *identifiable* now as, 'oh those are the PRT guys.' They aren't even scared of us; look at the trucks they're driving in." (CF)

Aligning the CF with humanitarian aid raised concern from participants on a variety of fronts, including the perceived compromised security of NGOs and the perceived use of the humanitarian space for ulterior motives on the part of the CF. Nonetheless, participants also suggested some potential benefits of improving CF optics, such as improved security for the CF in theatre, and increased support for the CF on the part of the public, both local and at home in Canada.

3.3.3   Media

Several participants indicated, however, that due to the fact that the media tends only to report on negative situations, and the fact that the CF do not themselves promote any of their more positive accomplishments in theatre, the CF image remains primarily in the hands of the media. Indeed, the media was often mentioned as a concern when it comes to optics. The media is complicit in the present image of both the CF and NGOs, and is an integral part of NGO funding, yet participants mentioned that the media itself is generally uneducated as to what is actually

happening in theatre and often prefers to go for the sensational, negative story, rather than to report on the good that is being done. As one NGO participant stated:

> "I think the media reports in a way that perpetuates the mythology, stereotypes, and misunderstandings between the military and NGOs. There *are* exceptions. There are reporters who do this and journalists and photographers and broadcasters who do this for a living and then they tend to get it right and understand very clearly the nature and characteristics and the strengths and shortcomings of NGOs *and* the military. But, in general, I think the media doesn't help at all because they're not very well educated themselves." (NGO)

Despite the fact that the CF has Public Affairs officers whose role is to support CF operations and activities by promoting awareness among Canadians of CF roles, missions, mandates, tasks and contributions to Canadian society and the international community, the media in general is seen to prefer to report on the violent and negative aspects of conflict, rather than on the positive aspects emerging from the conflict zone. As the following participants pointed out:

> "So, the media plays a *huge* role and the problem is 'bang bang' sells, happy people working together doesn't sell. So there's a real distortion that the media is not doing anybody any favours." (SME)

> "Military were distributing solar panels to women for them to start their own gardens, and harness the solar energy. But we never heard about that. No, maybe it doesn't go after those nice stories, they go after the, you know, IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and bombings, and Taliban, etcetera, right? So, I think the media doesn't help the perception of military also doing good, which, at the same time, then keeps feeding into the NGO this idea that the military are *only*, only combative or only… So I think it doesn't help on any side." (NGO)

NGOs, on the other hand, perceive themselves as more media savvy, using the media as a means of developing or sustaining their funding by promoting their activities. As the following NGO participant suggested:

> "NGOs don't feel as though they're not well reported by the media, because they have every capacity themselves to tell stories about what they do and, in fact, if they didn't do that, they would never have donor support. I mean it's something that's important to them, but they don't use the same technique to do that. They file stories themselves, they have people who are responsible for public affairs, and it's, you know, I mean, that's the way it is. I think CBC [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] did a good job of trying to report on a variety of things from Afghanistan last year but, you know, there's so many constraints that *they* feel exactly the same constraints related to access, and if they want to go to places where the fighting is occurring to report on that, there's only one way they're going to get there and that's in the back of an armored vehicle,. So you know, I mean, I think everybody understands that's the way it is." (NGO)

While the desired images of the CF and NGOs differed somewhat, the reasons for the maintenance and improvement of their respective images were similar. Linked to security, public

support and relationship building, optics, in the eyes of both the CF and NGO participants, was seen, quite literally, as a life and death issue.

3.4 Differences in Organizational Culture and Structure

Not surprisingly, differences in organizational culture and structure emerged as a frequent theme in the discourse of the participants. Literature on the topic has previously identified this as one of the main barriers to an effective NGO and CF relationship. According to the participants, both CF and NGO, differences in organizational culture and structure result in lack of role clarity and misunderstandings, as well as missed opportunities for communication, information sharing and coordination. This section will explore the main subthemes that emerged under the topics of both organizational culture and structure. It should be noted that participants were quick to point out the diversity within the CF and across NGOs; thus their comments must be understood as generalizations rather than descriptive of homogenous organizations.

3.4.1 Organizational Culture

3.4.1.1 Values: Differences in Motivation, Interpretation and Achieving Goals

The values held by both NGOs and the CF were frequently linked to organizational culture[8]. While participants expressed a similarity in the values of members of the CF and NGOs, they described the motivation behind those values and the interpretation of those values as fundamentally different, and expressed that these differences are often responsible for the strained relationship between NGOs and the CF. In the words of one NGO participant:

> "I think the shared value is that both military and NGOs, they're often guided and influenced by the *same* value which *is*, you know, to make things right in the world whatever you view that to be. It's just that I think NGOs and military probably view different *things* as being right. So, I think a lot of people who are in the military are genuinely dedicated to, you know, making the world a better place, and so are NGOs, but the devil's in the details, so you know, what does a better place mean for the military and what does it mean for an NGO. So I think when you move down a level or two, that's when you get into some *conflicting interpretations and applications* of those values. So the core values may not be all that different but as I said, it's when you get into the interpretation of what, and the realities of what those values *mean* on the ground, that's when I think you get into trouble." (NGO)

The means with which the CF and NGOs achieve goals stemming from those values was also expressed as different:

> "Where they differ is in the control orientation. Their vision of how things get done. The military tends to think that it can act on an environment and push it or achieve an effect with the power that it brings *into* the environment. In other words the military kicks in

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[8] Organizational culture may be defined as: Organizational Culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration and that have worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1984, p. 4)

doors to get things done. The development workers do not kick in doors. In development, the door opens from the other side. And you need to have a relationship with the inhabitants of wherever it is you want to work and you work with them by invitation. You're a low power intervener, the development side. Whereas on the military side, you're a high power intervener and there are pros and cons on both of those. But ultimately, the deeper values I think are quite common, quite similar." (SME)

"I think we differ in the sense that, how we *get* there might be different but I think ultimately the end goal is the same. Obviously, we want to leave the country in a safe and stable environment and so and so forth and the NGOs, that's *exactly* what they want as well, one would hope. So, I think the *goal* is the same, [but] sometimes how we get there may be a bit different. And that may be due to *values* and it may be due to religious aspects in an NGO it could be funding or *political* aspects in an NGO and vice-versa with the military as well, but I think ultimately the end goal is the same. So the values at the end are the same." (CF)

One soldier expressed that because the values of NGOs and the CF were the same, he felt that this similarity in values could be the key to "bridging the gap" between the two types of organizations. However, he admits that this would be a challenge:

"If you go back to what it is that you're trying to achieve, then we all value human life. We all value and respect empathy, and integrity. Treat others as you want to be treated. I believe *those* values are the same but, you know, at the end of the day we value human life in that we want to protect it as soldiers. The NGO community, you know, I've never been in it, but my association with it is that they value and wanna protect basic human need. So, it's similar but it's different. Different trains of thoughts and different approaches. But at a core level I believe that bridging into that core level is the *real* challenge. How you can, you know, it's, I always say [when] I have an ear of somebody who will listen, I would say "It's not about me. It's not about you. It's about them." You know, we call it the center of gravity. And we haven't defined the center of gravity in Afghanistan because everybody has their own opinion, but if you really know it, the center of gravity is the people. So, understanding the people and working the people and affecting the people, that's the key is the *effect* on the people and the *effect* with the people. If you understand *that* then you can bridge that gap." (CF)

Thus, the values of CF and NGOs, while similar at their core, are enacted differently, interpreted differently, and are influenced by different motivations. While similar goals may be a means of bridging the gap, members of NGOs in particular indicated that this is a case of the end not justifying the means, resulting in a reluctance to form a relationship with the CF in theatre.

3.4.1.2   Gender

Another difference in organizational culture which emerged prominently in the discourse of the participants was that of composition, and in particular, as it relates to gender. Participants echoed the commonly heard statement that members of NGOs are more diverse ethnically, more likely to be female than male, and more likely to be young, while the CF was indicated to be less diverse in terms of ethnicity, more likely male, and more likely to be older than members of NGOs. Interestingly, however, the only factor that participants discussed at length as an issue was

gender. This emerged as a concern not simply in terms of the relationship between NGOs and the CF, but also as a concern within the respective organizations themselves, as well as in interactions with the local public. This first excerpt describes gender-related challenges faced by NGOs in relation to the military:

> "I think the biggest challenge I've had and I've been actually told this by military people, which is interesting, I'd come in (a) quite young, new graduate, and I'm a woman and I have no military background and so getting your thoughts heard and actually acknowledged and actioned is a very difficult process." (NGO)

This next excerpt spoken by a female CF member describes how being female can be challenging when working with the local public, but that self-reflection and perseverance are necessary characteristics of a soldier trying to establish a working relationship with the public:

> "So, I had to speak with the mayor of the town and when I walked in he talked to my driver who was male, he's like, 'Well, ya know, what are you going to do for me?' You know, it's very machismo kind of atmosphere and very 'What is a *girl* going to do with me, yeah useless.' She's in uniform, doesn't matter. And his community and village elders… [who represented the NGO]… needed help and they needed some things. So *I* had to put myself in *his* shoes, instead of getting angry and saying, 'Why is he calling me a girl?' and, you know, 'What am *I* going to do for him' you know, okay, I understand it's a very machismo kind of, like, [the] atmosphere [was] very *masculine.* You've never dealt with a woman. So, there is a couple of different things, how am I going to speak to *him* so that he understands that, maybe I *can* do something for you and I *still* wear this uniform and maybe it'll change *your* mind about the Canadian Forces. At the end I got a certificate to, like a key to the city, or the key to the town, and … *now* the next time someone comes in that may be female he may not make the same comment and it'll change *his* mind as well. So, I think that's where the NGO and the military kind of can affect each other if they can understand each other's *side* and try to *appreciate*; okay, I understand where he's coming from, let's move on, but let's see what we can do to build a relationship instead of shutting it down." (CF)

The following participants described how gender can also be an issue both within the CF and within NGOs themselves, but that this cultural aspect is changing:

> "Well, I just know from my own experience working in a male-dominated army that some people have no issue and some people do have a problem with my gender. And the culture is starting to change, with that I mean there's still quite a huge difference. Like I'm going to be on course next week, and I'm the only woman on the course. I've learned how to negotiate that. In the beginning it was quite difficult. *Quite* difficult …. And it was a struggle for me. But, like I said in the beginning … being in the military has made me a stronger person." (CF)

> "I think there still *are* gender issues in NGO work, I haven't come across any NGOs that still have explicit or even prominent gender discrimination or gender issues. There's still maybe some underlying subtleties in NGO work that *inadvertently* discriminates against women. But *that* would be the extent of it. And then probably a lot of NGOs don't even have that. It seems to me that the problem with gender issues with NGOs, is actually in the countries and in the fields where one is working. So it's not actually in the NGOs themselves, it's in their beneficiary populations, host countries, etcetera, and national contexts." (NGO)

More optimistically, participants also indicated how gender differences are a benefit to mission success, and could in fact act as a catalyst in generating effective relationships between those administering aid and the local public, as indicated by the following NGO participant:

> "We were the only nation that had women engineers. So, in the end, you know, picture if you will, an engineer speaking to an audience, who was behind a screen because they were Afghan women and on the other side are interpreters that are interpreting into Pashto or Dari or, you know, whatever language. So, the instructor has no feedback, but eventually, because we had women engineers, the tribal elders allowed them to have face-to-face contact with the Afghan women because the women and children were the usual victims of mine accidents. Right, and *so* because of the success of our mine awareness program, in total, the 13 nations contributing to this, it evolved into mine clearance, and then training of mine clearance, training of trainers! So it took on a life of its own. But, at the same time, based on the success of our women having direct contact with Afghan women we were able to *piggyback* things like maternal childcare … that and other public health issues on the mine awareness program so that, you know, a one-day event turned into three, into five, and so it sort of took on a life of its own and had a bigger impact on the welfare of the Afghan women …" (NGO)

This same participant indicated that women may be able to form more effective working relationships with communities in need, through connection with the women of those communities:

> "And you know when women get together a different picture of humanitarian *needs* emerge because with the men, they *tell you* what they *want,* not necessarily what they *need*. And so you try to close the gap between what they want and what they need and try to do that within the overall budgetary framework. But when the *women* talked to our women the priorities shift slightly because humanitarian intervention, when it's delivered through the hands of men, invariably turns into a demonstration of *power,* but that *same* assistance delivered through the hands of women is a humanitarian act because it has an immediate impact on her immediate family, her extended family and the wider community." (NGO)

Thus, both CF and NGO participants expressed how gender discrimination is a potential factor influencing an effective relationship within and across the two organizations as well as affecting dealings with local NGOs and the local public in general. Interestingly, however, the possibility of gender being a catalyst for effective relationships with the public and for general mission success was also raised by NGO and CF participants alike.

3.4.1.3   Competition for Funding

A well known aspect of NGO organizational culture involves competition for funding. This topic emerged in the discourse of the participants as an important aspect of the characterization of NGO organizational culture, and could have a negative effect on the formation of the NGO and CF relationship, should collaboration reduce funding to an NGO:

> "*Suspicious*, *jealous* in *competition* for the same funds." (NGO)

"An NGO is in the business of helping people. And if you don't have successful projects to solicit money for *funding* you're not going to be in business for very long." (CF)

"So, they'll put all their effort in one sector and not necessarily coordinate with another NGO because it's competition right? 'I want the money, I don't want UNICEF [United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund] to get the money, World Food Program wants the money.' Instead of doing the cooperation between themselves. NGOs tend not to want to cooperate between themselves, because it's still a competition." (CF)

"I think it's extremely competitive again because of donor issues. I think the bigger NGOs probably talk to each other but I'm not sure to what extent they actually share information." (NGO)

Participants indicated that the competition among NGOs for donor money results in duplication of resources and a reluctance to collaborate. Access and availability of donor funding in turn influences planning and determines where an NGO is likely to operate. Participants suggested that the competitive nature of NGOs may be a contributing factor to their reluctance to work with the CF. However, most participants, CF and NGO alike, felt that since funding derives from different resources, there is no actual competition for funding with the CF. As such, it is more likely that the reluctance to collaborate in part stems from fear of losing funding should an NGO be seen as collaborating with the CF.

3.4.1.4   Decision Making and Adaptability

Continuing with differences in organizational culture, participants, both NGO and CF, also expressed how NGOs and the CF have different approaches to decision making, each with its own assets and drawbacks:

"They [NGOs] don't approach the military's methods of decision making, because the military has much more well defined, might I say a rigid, categories and processes of decision making, and that can't change. I think that NGOs are much more able to problem solve in the field and the areas where they are … NGO workers are given much more *latitude* and much more *autonomy* and *responsibility*. They're much more *able* to problem solve and to make decisions in the field because they have very in depth knowledge of what's going on in that particular community or a particular region, particular culture. Whereas once again, the military tends to *have to ask* people." (NGO)

"They, you know, the Canadian Forces ticks on a very intricate and very disciplined operational planning process. Even for enlisted soldiers from your junior NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] course on you're taught how to do an estimate of a situation, you're taught a certain way to do, what they call battle procedure, which brings you out to how you make your plan. NGOs tend to, especially the more humanitarian ones at the field level, they make it up as they go along. Now they'll have plans, programs, those kinds of things that come from the top, but the implementation, is not nearly as disciplined as it is in the military." (CF)

While these differences in decision making could be seen as a barrier to successful partnership between the two types of organizations, many participants expressed that this was an area where the CF and NGOs could learn from one another, potentially facilitating their relationship.

3.4.2   Structure

3.4.2.1   Hierarchy and Role Clarity

Participants expressed that even when efforts are being made to bridge across the organizational cultures and collaborate, differences in organizational structure[9] may hinder this process. As one NGO participant indicated, she was not being heard by the military members she was working with, not due to lack of respect, but due to differences in organizational structure, rendering them unable to follow through on her recommendations:

> "I *know* that they respect me … so it's not a respect issue, it's very much a ranking thing. And they value you because they know that you have the experience that *they* don't have, but I think they just, I think it's a matter of not knowing where to slot you in." (NGO)

In this case, organizational differences are seen by participants as hindering what is understood on both sides to be a valuable contribution on the part of NGOs toward humanitarian efforts. Solving this problem, however, may not be as simple as assigning rank, since as one participant indicated, identity is paramount to the ranking system, and forming a working relationship with those who do not fit within the military system disrupts this system and hence the identity of the actors within:

> "I think this is an important distinction. You run into a problem in the military that if you have this kind of collaborative, collegial power relationship you blow the identity of the actors out of the water …. I think you need to find a way of handling this issue in a way that does not damage the chain of command, 'cause there is a lot of good in the chain of command and there's a lot of order and all of that." (SME)

This participant suggested finding a way to collaborate while working within the military chain of command in order to keep the benefits of the organizational structure intact.

3.4.2.2   Differences in Mandates

Another concern stemming from organizational structure involved differences in mandates. NGO participants cited a fundamental lack of compatibility with the military due to the perceived differences in mandates and a fear that working with the military could compromise those mandates:

> "I also think that NGOs feel that military and NGOs work for completely different purposes, and that the military, despite its mandate as peacekeepers, and despite some of the areas of operation, some of the work they've done, despite that, NGOs feel that

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[9] Organizational structure refers to the formal configuration between individuals and groups with respect to the allocation of tasks, responsibilities, and authorities within organizations (Galbraith, 1987).

militaries are primarily for war and primarily for killing and weapons kinds of mentalities, where NGOs feel that they are at the opposite end of that continuum. I think that NGOs and military are extremely, well I can't really say NGOs and military are extremely wary of each other 'cause I'm not sure if the military is wary of NGOs, but NGOs are *very* wary of the military. And that's also because there's an underlying *suspicion* in NGOs that our work and our information and our *relationships*, which have been carefully built in many countries, you know, over 50 years and if not 50, you know 10, 15, 20 years – the reputation that we have *so* carefully built up over however many years, the missions are in place, the country offices are in place, that they are actually in danger of being used for purposes that NGOs would not consider legitimate, even essential to their own mandate." (NGO)

"I think you *cannot* get past the fact that humanitarian organizations are guided by fundamental (humanitarian) principles and the decision making processes at the higher levels within the military for development work or what the military call humanitarian work are *not* guided by the same principles. In particular, the principle of impartiality says that assistance is provided *solely* on the basis of need. That *clearly* isn't the case when the military are providing humanitarian assistance. The principle of independence says that the organization itself makes its decisions about how assistance should be provided and it doesn't rely on government or other authorities to dictate to it how it will do its job. That *clearly* isn't the case for the military in the way that they execute the direction provided to them for the conduct of humanitarian work. And the principle of humanity which talks about the motivation for humanitarian work is another case of difference. The fundamental thing that the military forget is that they *can't* be neutral, they're a *party* to the conflict, if somebody deploys to Kandahar to carry a weapon and to kill the Taliban, they're a combatant. If somebody deploys to Kandahar to do CIMIC work and they wear a uniform and they carry a weapon, well they wear a uniform, even if they *don't* carry a weapon, they're a combatant. So, fundamentally, they're a party to the conflict and the only people that *aren't* parties to the conflict are military religious and medical personnel. So, for me, that's the fundamental contradiction. You can call it humanitarian work all you like, it's not possible that it is motivated in a manner which enables it to be so." (NGO)

Despite this perception of fundamental, insurmountable differences in mandates, some (non-NGO) participants discussed a flexibility within the CF with which many NGOs are unfamiliar. As the following participants suggested, the Canadian military is known for its flexibility, and there exist misconceptions amongst NGOs about CF motivations for the humanitarian work they wish to accomplish:

"So, you've got this illusion of a chain of command in the military and it provides order and structure and it is a lot of good things about it, but when your people find themselves in a situation for which they've not been trained or the orders don't make sense, they act on their own. Actually, the Russians apparently said something about Canadian military and doctrine. They said that it's very difficult to figure out what the Canadian military's going to do because they don't pay any attention to their doctrine." (SME)

" 'We're not going to be able to put your name on this project,' and we're like, 'We don't want that.' And they're like, 'Really? Oh, well, that's awesome!' That right there is often a winning point. But this project, we got approved for it, and they were like, 'Alright,

excellent!' But, when they went to their chain of command or their headquarters or their authority chain or whatever you want to call it they were like, 'Whoa, what are you doing, we're not allowed to work with the military, that's not in our constitution – stop stop stop stop stop!' And so that project … sat on our books for months. We had approval for it, we were going to give you the money, we didn't want any credit, just take the money and do what you're going to do. It's a good project. So, eventually, people from the headquarters, in a western country, came to visit and the people on the ground took the individuals to the PRT to meet us, and sat down with us, for like a whole afternoon. And we sat there and we explained, 'Look, we don't want credit for this, we don't want our label on it, we just want good projects to happen." And at the end, *they* sat there with their mouths open and went, 'Oh my god' and said, 'We have to go back and change our entire constitution.' Because their constitution said, 'You *will not* work with the military.' " (CF)

While the mandates of the CF and many NGOs appear to be completely at odds, CF and SME participants were hopeful that flexibility on the part of the CF and exposure to each other's organizational differences may allow for loopholes where collaboration could occur.

3.4.2.3   Timelines

Continuing with the discussion of organizational differences in structure, differing timelines were raised by participants as both a barrier and a facilitator to the NGO and CF relationship. Many suggested that short rotations affected the ability of the CF to sustain the projects implemented and relationships built. In the words of one CF participant, "Rotos is what kills the effectiveness [and] the sustainability of military inputs." However, at the same time, several participants suggested a symbiotic relationship between the CF and NGOs, where the CF provides security and an initial influx of 'quick projects' to jump-start the economy of the country in conflict, while NGOs come in afterward to provide a means of sustaining humanitarian work, thus providing an exit strategy for the CF. This relationship seemed to exist on a humanitarian continuum, and participant opinions varied on where the CF fell on that continuum:

"Well, yeah, just that we're short-sighted. We're looking for the quick impact now. And our philosophy behind that is, with CIMIC is, we do the quick projects *now* to get money into the economy *now*, while the NGOs and the OGDs and the IOs do the bigger projects, those [that] take longer to get off the ground. So, if we do things quick now, the locals can see that things are happening and then when the bigger projects come online we'll step back and they can … take over so to speak." (CF)

"You know, we know in the Canadian Armed Forces that our exit strategy *is* these individuals … because an NGO was there before and an NGO will be there after, and we are guys there in between trying to provide security. And so the development of these, and finding these appropriate people who could act on the behalf of these organizations in that vacuum, that's one of the ways we can support our exit strategy." (CF)

"The mandates have not been clear, not only the mandates but the motivation for the military being involved in certain kinds of activities has not been clear. I do think that the military has a very significant role to play in international *work*, but I think that that role is quite limited and has to *do directly* with the strengths and the abilities of the military and when the military begins to do stuff that it *isn't* naturally good at or even if it's *good*

at it, it's not its primary mandate; that's when I think things tend to get quite muddled and quite difficult." (NGO)

"I have fairly black and white views on this. The military to my mind should almost never be involved in humanitarian activity in a conflict zone. Military involvement in humanitarian activity is almost impossible to be, you know, impartial or neutral, right? Because that's not what the military is here for. The military is here to support the government, and therefore, expecting them to deliver, you know, food to starving people in the aftermath of the battle if the starving people have just been shooting at you is generally not something that militaries are good at. As far as I'm concerned, the *only* military involvement on the humanitarian side should be right in the conflict zone at the tactical level, during and right after, and essentially it falls under the duty of care responsibilities that they have under the law of armed conflict. So, basically, they should be protecting non-combatants, and when the combatants are subdued, if you can tell who was a combatant and who wasn't, the only humanitarian assistance that you should be providing is immediate relief, food, medical, that kind of stuff. Very basic level stuff, until the situation is stabilized enough that the civilians can take over." (CF)

Despite the variation in the level of involvement of the CF in humanitarian work, and doubts about the feasibility of a working relationship between NGOs and the CF, participants generally felt that there was a role for the CF to take in international work, from security to first responder humanitarian relief, depending on the context of the situation. This acknowledgement of a role for the CF may represent a point at which the two organizational communities could initiate a working relationship, although what that relationship might look like remains to be seen.

3.5   Lack of Trust

A prominent theme that emerged from this study concerned trust as a mitigating factor in the decision of an NGO to work with the military. This is a theme that permeated the conversations of both sets of participants, who indicated that working together in any capacity hinges on the topic of trust. The general understanding was that forming a relationship between the military and NGOs would be risky, in terms of compromising perceived NGO neutrality as well as in terms of undermining their reputation with the communities in which they work. NGOs also questioned CF motivations behind forming a relationship. However, some participants also pointed out that "trust works both ways" and that the military often lacks trust in NGOs as well:

"If I was approached by the Canadian Forces to partner, or have some kind of more formal relationship, I would want those questions asked, you know, what are your objectives, *why* are you doing this, what's in it for *you*, what's in it for the organization? And then I would be asking myself and talking with other members of my NGO, what would it mean to partner with the Canadian Forces and what would that look like, and how would people look at us? And, are we willing to go there, are we willing to take that risk? Because I do think it could be a risky partnership for many NGOs." (NGO)

" No. Definitely NGOs will not trust military. I think it'll always be that way…. I've tried to bring people back to the table, you know. And people keep going away because it's military. It's a constant, and again the only reason the people are coming back is because of a personal relationship. So, I think there's a general mistrust of the military for sure.

And I don't think the military really care about NGOs, to be honest. Whether they trust someone, I don't think it's even a factor." (NGO)

"Trust for military people, trust is largely based, I think, when you don't know each other, on performance. So, when an NGO does what was from our perception a very uncoordinated and dumb thing, like bringing old people back to their houses, in an uncoordinated way with no provisions for security, you tend not to trust them." (CF)

For the NGOs in these excerpts, there is mistrust of military motivations behind forming a relationship, as well as a fear that any information passed between the two groups would be used by the military for reasons that that did not align with NGO values. In contrast, the military's reason for not trusting the NGO stemmed from the perception of NGO performance in the field, and from the belief that they did not know what they were doing.

3.5.1   Trust is Security

Several participants connected trust with security, emphasizing the importance of developing trust between the various actors in theatre:

"I gained trust with a number of NGOs I worked with and it worked out well because when their *new* set of volunteers came in I gave them a little spiel on what CIMIC does in the Canadian Forces. I think without that trust there, there would be no way that [an] NGO would let me come in and say, 'You know what, we're a really great organization and *work* with us.' How it can work if there isn't that trust there, you're just going to be shut out. They're *not* going to give you information, there *may* be something happening in an area that you have *no idea about* but could be detrimental to either the mission or people or what have you. An NGO may not tell you because now it will hurt their credibility if it's ever found out they are the one that told you and they don't trust you. So I think trust is *huge*, because there *is* nothing else really, I mean there's no *money* changing hands, it's that relationship you build. So I've seen it positively in the sense that they trust you they're going to trust you with information, with *giving* information, educating their new people coming in. I've seen it work with *no trust* and they're not going to tell you anything. So and I've seen *that* happen as well. And they won't *warn* you or they won't give you a *head's up* or *give* you some pointers or something like that so I think trust is huge." (CF)

As this participant suggested, lack of trust can result in missed opportunities to communicate about security issues, placing importance on the process of building trust.

3.5.2   Building Trust

The importance of building trust between NGOs and the CF and the means with which to do so was mentioned frequently by participants, both NGO and CF. Some CF participants indicated that the best means to build trust was to develop "the right people" as CIMIC operators, in order to build effective relationships with NGOs and other members of the public:

"So, we are *finally* starting to develop proper operators *for* the job they're supposed to do. Finding the right guy will develop that trust I keep talking about. With trust builds a relationship, with the relationship builds the capacity, so on and so on and so on and so forth. The ability to do so. *Those*, I hate to say it in my organization, but, we do not have a sustainable model." (CF)

"I think, again, that's all personality driven. And if you have that *right* person, who already has that skill set, it's easier to build the trust and trust is so easily lost. You have to be so very careful. And if you're making promises, or think you're making promises and don't live up to them it can be very damaging to what you're trying to do. I think NGOs don't think that the Canadian military are sincere in their desire and that they have another agenda. And sometimes, yeah, sometimes there is another agenda and sometimes there are things that we're looking for that doesn't fit with the development aspect, it's more of a security aspect. But, you got to have all three of those pieces of the triangle for it to stand up. I don't know, I think that's hard for them to resolve within themselves." (CF)

Participants also expressed that trust can be built informally, as suggested by the following NGO participant:

"I guess the difficulty is that in some places, *certainly* in the military you can say things to people which would not then be passed on. That *usually* isn't the case in the NGO community. The way relationships work, I think, are very important. With some military organizations, I would be happy to say things off the record and expect that, I wouldn't say it if I didn't want a message passed about something but I would expect it to be dealt with a degree of respect for protecting the source. And with other military organizations, I wouldn't even open my mouth. I was happy, always happy to have a very open dialogue with the Canadian Forces people about different things and I think as a rule they are pretty careful to *use* the information without abusing the source. So, I think that is very important. I guess, I'd say that it's not something that's going to develop overnight and if you don't have a regular dialogue with people, you don't develop the trust. I mean, everybody appreciates that, so it becomes a question of making sure that you don't just see people once every 3 months and expect that something will come out of that, it won't." (NGO)

Thus, participants indicated that building trust between NGOs and the CF is something that requires the "right" people for the job, and that such a capability needs to be further developed within the CF. Participants also mentioned how a trusting relationship is something that requires constant work and care, and can and already does happen through both formal and informal processes.

3.5.3 Trust in Traditional Roles

Interestingly, lack of trust did not seem to be an issue when the military adhered to the role for which they are known and respected, that of providing security, as suggested by the following NGO participant:

"Trust played a role because I trusted that they were going to get us out of there in one piece. It was quite a violent situation and the military did play a *huge* role in negotiating

for the evacuation of foreigners during that time. So, we were working in their hands. Trust was pretty huge. We trusted that they were evacuating us to a safe place and then we trusted them to protect us … when we were in that safe place." (NGO)

Most NGO participants indicated that security was the main role that the CF should play in humanitarian work. Their trust in the CF when performing a security role may indicate that the lack of trust discussed in other circumstances is linked to concern regarding ulterior motives on the part of the CF, and not a mistrust of the organization as a whole. When performing the tasks where participants believe CF motivations to be transparent, NGO trust in the CF, and even willingness to interact, is apparent.

3.6   Training, Education and other Recommendations

3.6.1   Education, Training, Exposure

The main recommendation stemming from the interviews was the suggestion that training and education, particularly joint training, would be the remedy to address the strained NGO and CF relationship. Participants indicated that at present, there exists very little training and education on civil-military cooperation, either within the CF or within many of the NGOs. As an NGO participant indicated below, in the rare situation when training involved exposure of the CF and NGOs to one another, the results were immediately noticeable:

> "I *think* Canada-based NGOs, I think that it is *important* to educate them in the ways of the military. And, you know, a number of years ago [name withheld] put together a roundtable on defence, diplomacy, and development in a neutral platform, brought a number of disparate players to that. And so, the first day or so there was palpable tension between the military and the tree huggers. And then as time went on, as they started *talking* to each other, they found that they have *common things to talk about.* And at the end of the third day, acknowledgment that yes, the military, you guys are good at doing *this*, humanitarians are good at doing *this*. Two publications ensued from that, promoted better *understanding* of the *role* of the military and the *role* the humanitarian community. And I think that is important for the military to continue to have this outreach program…." (NGO)

Both NGO and CF participants recommended that the CF and NGO training systems need improvement to reflect the reality of what soldiers and humanitarian workers are experiencing in theatre, and to improve the potential for effective interaction with one another. Views of the types of training required, however, differed according to the organization.

3.6.1.1   CF Training

For the CF, participants recommended training that increased exposure and understanding of humanitarian and development work so that CF members might be better informed when interacting with those in the humanitarian space, and better able to form effective working relationships in whatever form they take.

"I think the military's training system … needs to be modified to produce officers, members that know *enough* about development so that they can act in an appropriate fashion when they're into the non-kinetic aspects of what they're doing." (SME)

"It's that lack of trust, lack of education. Maybe in the future it'll develop once those relationships have been built, but at this point its relationship and trust and education. We're extremely lacking in that…I think they received one 60-minute period at RMC [Royal Military College] on civil-military cooperation." (CF)

3.6.1.2   NGO Training

For NGOs, participants recommended training to increase the uniformity of professional competence amongst NGOs. It was suggested that training amongst NGOs currently reflects the diversity of the organizations themselves, in that some NGOs provide training, while others do not, and that this is dependent on the level of funding provided to the NGOs. In the first excerpt below, the participant suggests that professionalization and standardization of the NGO work force may foster improved relationships with the CF:

"It's important for say CIDA or some other development branch of government to *provide* for the professionalization of the NGO work force. I think that's really important because good humanitarian notions does not translate into effective humanitarian action on the ground. And there are certain things that are *common* in the approach of NGOs, you know, whether you are solely focused on emergency relief, or early recovery, or long-term recovery, and reconstruction and development, there [are] certain things that are *common* to NGOs, and if there is any sort of uniformity in that or standardization and professionalization of the NGO work force, I think that will go a long ways towards reducing *one* of the barriers [to] *better* sort of understanding between the military and the NGO. The military are professionals, NGOs are as well, but there's no uniformity to their level of professional competence." (NGO)

"Periodic … you get a lot of training *with* the NGOs; you get a lot of different training. So, with (name of an NGO), I got a lot of *manage*ment training, time management, human resources, financial analysis, program management, project management, *leader*ship, interpersonal skills, communication. I mean frankly if you work for an NGO that's quite well off you get a lot of training and if you work for one that's not, you don't get very much." (NGO)

3.6.1.3   Public Education

Participants also indicated that public education would also be beneficial in promoting a better relationship between the CF and NGOs:

"In terms of resources and the political influence and motivation that I talked about, I think that public education is essential for Canadians to understand what Canada's role in international relations and peace keeping and development should be and I don't see much public education of *much* value to be honest. So, I think public education would

help a lot and it would help Canadians to make more informed decisions and choices. I mean about elections, I mean in terms of pressuring and giving input to the government. So, I think public [education] is a big one. I think public education – maybe it's *the* big one. Hopefully public education would also lead to increased resources for missions and for relief and development, and a greater percentage of Canada's budget would be allocated to this kind of overseas work. I think better training is a good solution. Better training and orientation for everyone, for the military, for NGOs and for the UN. I think that's key. I think changes in the way we do business and I don't just mean coordination again, but that's another one that would help. A better defined and increased accountability of *all* the humanitarian actors to the United Nations. I think that's important." (NGO)

3.6.1.4   Exposure

As a further means of improving the NGO and CF relationship, participants recommended training that facilitates exposure of NGO and CF members to one another and that promotes dialogue between the two groups. Participants agreed that much could be gained from honest discussion of the concerns faced on both sides of the equation:

> "I think education and awareness, making the effort to reach out to NGO members. *Talk* about *what* are the goals of the Canadian Forces in humanitarian development efforts? What are the/their goals and why do they want to go there and do that? Or even, get together with some *key* members of the NGO community in Canada, for example, and to brainstorm. And come up with *ideas*, you know, and thoughts on what would this look like? What are the pros and cons of partnership? What would each organization get out of this? What are the risks? And things like that might be an even better way to sort of start … improving relations." (NGO)

> "Where you learn enough about what the other parties are doing so that they can cross train. You become interdependent and if you're well managed and well led and the personalities are right and the work is right, you get a really creative hybrid, which is a joy to be with. Ideally, the development/military mix ought to be like that. But, you don't get that just by throwing people onto a plane and having them jump off somewhere and start work. You've got to *build* that. And so, you need the *time before* show time to develop that kind of esprit de corps." (SME)

> "How are you going to find that common ground is to have public forums, inviting people, coming up with contemporary issues that may be contentious. *Or*, if you want to *devolve* such an activity to an academic institution where the military will be a *participant*, rather than the organizer of an event. So, that would in turn sort of neutralize some of the animosity of the military doing something and taking over things, and, being in the lead. Whereas, if it's an event that includes the military, other institutions, and the wider NGO community and do it on a regular basis on contemporary issues, that would be a great education, not only for the military but for the NGO community and the wider Canadian public." (NGO)

> "And I think we have to make a greater effort to do joint training. So that people *can* see what it is we do, and … that it's not all about getting out there and shooting up them bad

guys. It's about seeing the bigger picture and understanding what else is goin' on. And so by having those other people there, you both learn." (CF)

As indicated in these excerpts, exposure to one another, whether through academic conferences or joint training, was a common theme in the interviews. Key to the success of this exposure, however, is the opportunity for open dialogue. This suggests an openness to entering into a conversation, which as one participant suggests, could occur on a neutral ground, with neutral individuals in charge of the meetings, so that both groups could feel comfortable that they were on equal, impartial ground.

3.6.2 Promoting CIMIC

Participants, in particular those in the CF, advocated for the development and promotion of CIMIC as an imperative in improving the civil-military relationship, which they felt was essential to the success of the mission. CIMIC represents the bridge between the military and the public, and participants felt that the aforementioned lack of career path and lack of emphasis on selection for CIMIC does not allow this aspect of the military to live up to its potential.

3.6.2.1 Selection

As indicated throughout the interviews, participants (mainly CF) felt that CIMIC requires the "right" person for the job, suggesting that individuals predisposed to certain characteristics, and who may have training in areas such as international development, should be selected and carefully trained for their role as a CIMIC officer. However, this is not a common occurrence, as indicated by the CF member quoted below, who mentioned that this year was the first time he had seen people selected for CIMIC based on their competency and skills:

> "(Date in 2009) was the *first* time in my entire history, and I'm one of the veterans here, that we actually selected people based on their *competency* and *professional* skill-set." (CF)

Many participants indicated that CIMIC selection had been previously based upon availability and draws from reservists. It was suggested that reservists, by their nature, shift organizational cultures easily, but cannot be taken out of their civilian jobs for an extended period of time in order to train at length for a role in CIMIC. Participants indicated that more often than not, individuals are selected at the time of pre-deployment, without significant regard to their skill-set in relation to CIMIC work.

3.6.2.2 CIMIC as Full-time Career Path

Many of the participants in this study advocated for CIMIC to become a dedicated CF organization tasked with making the CF JIMP-enabled. According to these participants (all from the CF), the army needs to invest in this capability in order to achieve mission success:

> "You got to select them, train 'em, and then you throw them on their pre-deployment. So you need to get these guys a year out before they start the 6-month training. Get them on the courses. Get them read on the civilian pieces. He has the army piece, he needs to be educated and brought up to speed on the civilian aspect. And you can't do that in a 6-

month pre-deployment training. 'Cause it takes longer. Six months pre-deployment is focused on the country itself, not all the NGOs and what they're doing and how they're doing and all this good stuff. You do that in that one year *prior*. By going on those courses, going to, you know, CARE [Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere] Canada seminar on the weekend in Ottawa, or something like that. You've got to build that. So, right now we're doing the 'just in time' qualified guy, but not experience. So the challenge is to get [an] experienced individual. And that's investment. The army has to invest in this capability." (CF)

Participants indicated that currently, success in establishing connections and effective working relationships with NGOs and other potential partners in theatre depends on the senior CIMIC officer and his or her understanding of the theory and background, or the "big picture" of the current situation. Often, participants indicated, he or she has not had the training necessary to get the big picture. One participant indicated that while the army has invested in a pilot project of individuals working as CIMIC officers full time, the future implementation of a full-time program nation wide is undetermined, and should it occur will not happen for several more years. In the meantime, participants suggest that not enough emphasis is placed upon the importance of selection and training for CIMIC officers and the results of this are being seen in theatre.

3.6.3   Flexibility in Making Contact (Thinking outside the Box)

Participants, both CF and NGO, recommended that the military be flexible in dealing with the diversity of NGOs and their specific requirements in regard to contact with the military. An effective relationship may not come in the form of an actual partnership, given the constraints of some NGO mandates, but an effective relationship may still be forged though other means. A variety of "thinking outside the box" suggestions emerged from the interviews. For example, the participant quoted below suggested that an information board would be useful in situations where contact could not occur:

> "The military can *help* by having some sort of information bulletin board that is updated on a regular basis, essentially on the humanitarian condition, and secondly on the security situation. And that in turn could lead to sharing of wider information. You know, the NGO *might* feel inspired to pump in information into the military which may not be a *primary* source of intelligence, but would corroborate what they already know." (NGO)

Still others suggested that creating opportunities for dialogue, but not collaboration, would be possible in a conflict area as long as it did not compromise NGO neutrality:

> "*Not* collaboration, I mean, that's not happening *unless* this is not a conflict area. In a conflict area where you're a party to the conflict, you're *kidding* yourself if you think you're going to collaborate with anybody who is *not* a party to the conflict … You don't *want* to be seen to be cooperating in the field *if* it will compromise your neutrality or impartiality. I think it's a great idea to do this study and to look for ways to improve or to create mechanisms, but in a conflict area, some of the issues are really close to insurmountable. You can certainly have *very*, very good dialogue, you can have very good mutual respect, but there are just some things that preclude you getting too close together, I think, in a conflict area, you know, almost every step you take to get closer compromises the principles by which many organizations work …" (NGO)

Another participant suggested that creating guidelines regarding CF activities in the countries where they are currently working, as a means of disseminating information and demystifying the intentions of the CF, might allow for improved relations:

> "Maybe the Canadian Forces could provide some guidelines on certain elements *of their* work in specific countries that could be beneficial for NGOs. So, I guess in that sense that [it] could be a collaboration of some sort but it might be as simple as providing different types of guidelines, ways of doing things …" (NGO)

Another example of "outside of the box" thinking in establishing favourable NGO and CF relationships was mentioned by two CF participants who suggested simply that proximity may be a factor in establishing an effective relationship without compromising NGO neutrality:

> "There *are* ways of having it happen. You know, strategically locating the PRT. You know, in Kandahar it's neat because the PRTs, you know, here [draws at the top of diagram], we got the big city here [draws in middle of diagram], and all the NGOs are down here [draws on other side of the city from the PRT]. And the international community. And what if you were to put the PRT… [draws PRT next to NGO and international community]." (CF)

> "I think that there are going to be more operations like this where people are going to work together. You're going to be in the same place, you have, it's going to be a forced change. Not that people are going to come in and say 'okay, now this is going to happen.' But if you keep bumping into people in your neighborhood you're going to have to have conversations with them." (CF)

Thus, while constraints on the NGO and CF relationship are known to exist, and for the most part are respected, participants suggested ways of making contact and communicating that may be of benefit to both organizations, without compromising on the fundamental values held by NGOs, or for that matter, on the CF's fundamental approach to doing work.

4 Discussion

4.1 Findings

A number of findings emerged from this pilot study that may contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between NGOs and the CF, and suggest some directions toward improving their understanding of one another and their interaction in theatre. First, although some participants, both NGO and CF, expressed reservation at the thought of any type of interaction between NGOs and the CF, in theatre or otherwise, most acknowledged that a relationship is beneficial, in many cases inevitable, in some cases a necessity, and as these findings reveal, is often already in place. Both groups recognized the importance of the other's role, and agreed that these roles are ultimately interrelated within a broad security mission. However, participant thoughts on what the NGO and CF relationship should look like varied greatly depending on two aspects: (a) the context of the situation in which NGOs and the CF find themselves, and (b) the mandate of the NGO with whom the CF are interacting.

Addressing the first aspect, all participants felt that in a context such as a natural disaster, where the CF are not combatants and may effectively be seen as a neutral party, a relationship between the two organizations was acceptable. Given that in the case of a natural disaster, the goals of both organizations are transparent and in essence the same, it may be that NGO members feel that they can trust the motives of the CF, as well as interact with them, without compromising their neutrality. Addressing the issue of the mandate of the NGO with whom the CF are interacting, in this case, if neutrality is an integral part of the NGO mandate, then partnering with the CF in conflict areas is an impossibility. As one NGO participant suggested, the minute an NGO so much as accepts a CF escort, they've compromised their neutrality. In a conflict area, the CF are considered combatants and hence cannot be neutral parties, but participants suggested that this does not mean that the CF do not have a role to play in the humanitarian mission. Many participants felt that while NGOs and the CF could not interact within a conflict zone, a coordination of roles could be possible and is needed.

For example, participants perceived a broader mission, which could be broken down into stages, where in the first stage the CF are responsible for securing and maintaining the peace so that NGOs and other humanitarian and development workers can implement the second stage, humanitarian aid. Some of the CF participants pointed out that communication between NGOs and the CF is necessary in order to achieve this goal, for example, to make certain that the CF does not mistake NGOs for insurgents, to avoid an NGO so that they are not in any way affiliated with the CF, which some feel could affect their security, or to inform NGOs of a rapid change in insurgent activity. Participants even suggested creative ways in which the CF could communicate information to NGOs and others without face-to-face interaction, and hence without compromising neutrality, such as a general information board which could inform on both the humanitarian and security conditions. In situations such as these, participants indicated that reciprocation of security related information, while welcomed and useful, would not be necessary.

Interestingly however, despite widespread acknowledgement that NGOs and the CF already do not function separately, and that both groups may benefit from some form of relationship, participants struggled to express what any interaction between the CF and NGOs should look like. There was concern regarding any relationship in which one organization would be in charge

of the other, any relationship that compromised the neutrality of NGOs and any relationship that endangered either party or the beneficiaries of aid. Ultimately, most participants felt that the answer may involve flexible coordination that could maintain NGO impartiality and that could be tailored to the diversity of the situation and the organizations and individuals involved. Participants provided examples of "when it has worked," in which successful situations invariably involved individuals with the "right" personalities, who were willing to step outside of the rigid boundaries set by their respective organizations, and while not altering specific mandates, could be flexible in how they interacted with one another and respectful of what the other could bring to the table. Participants suggested that currently, the "right personalities" coming together is a random occurrence, one that the CF in particular feel could be improved upon and formalized through further development of the role of CIMIC within the CF. CIMIC officers are meant to be a bridge between the military and the public, that is, individuals who participants felt could "speak both military and civilian" and who could advise their commanding officer on the best approach to a given civil-military interaction. Participants belonging to the CF felt that while CIMIC has been developing over the years, it is the key to mission success in the increasingly complex environments within which the CF are working. It was suggested that priority given to appropriate selection criteria for this role is insufficient, and that the primary use of reservists in the role has resulted in individuals who were poorly prepared for their roles as CIMIC officers. Despite the fact that reservists naturally integrate well across the military and civilian cultures, their preparation for the position is short term, often commencing at the same time as pre-deployment training. Currently, there is no full-time career path for CIMIC officers, although one participant mentioned that a pilot study for a full-time program is underway.

Another major theme emerging from the data involved the management of optics. For both the CF and NGOs, the issue of optics was linked to security and mission success. NGO participants felt that an image of neutrality protects them from being associated with the CF and any security risks that this association may have. In addition, NGO participants felt that maintaining that image of neutrality, in combination with one of fulfilling humanitarian goals, increases the trust and maintains the relationships that they have with the local public. Perhaps equally important, the maintenance of this image keeps their donors happy and their funding intact. For the CF, participants felt that the improvement of the CF image, both in theatre and at home, may allow for benefits in terms of security and support from civilians, both in theatre and at home. Participants, both CF and NGO, reported positive experiences where the CF were able to facilitate the maintenance of NGO optics by communicating in a manner that maintained NGO neutrality. This supports the above finding that in some cases effective communication between the two groups already exists, and suggests that it is possible to facilitate development of a relationship that fulfills the requirements of NGOs but would allow NGOs and the CF to coordinate the broader mission. Findings suggest that the maintenance of NGO optics could benefit from a delicate balance of communication and avoidance in regard to the CF, while simple avoidance could in fact place them in a position of danger and of compromised neutrality. This coordination may not resemble what most think of as communication; but compromise and flexibility, or the ability to "think outside the box," are characteristics that participants indicated are prerequisites for this unique relationship. Findings also revealed that the media is complicit in promoting sensational, negative stories rather than positive ones, and that the CF should consider learning from the more media-savvy NGOs in regard to how to manage the media.

Organizational culture and structure also emerged as a major theme within the discourses of the participants. In regard to organizational culture, perhaps surprisingly, all of the participants indicated that the values and end goal of the CF and of NGOs were likely very similar. All felt

that both NGOs and the CF wanted to "do good" and protect basic human needs and rights. They suggested, however, that the motivation behind those values, the interpretation of those values, and the means of achieving goals associated with those values, were fundamentally different, and resulted in a strained relationship between the two organizations. While some participants suggested that this similarity in values allowed for an opportunity to bridge across organizations at a core level, many of the NGO participants felt that this was a case of the end not justifying the means, and were reluctant to see shared values as a potential facilitator to the NGO and CF relationship. Gender differences and the competitive nature of NGOs were also cited by participants as a hindrance to forming an effective relationship between the two organizations. In the case of gender differences, one NGO participant expressed how being a young woman was a barrier to having a voice with the CF, while another participant indicated that being female in the CF and working with an NGO from the host country, where women are not regarded in high esteem, was also a challenge. Benefits of women working with women (be they CF, NGOs or the local public) to further mission success, however, offered a possible bridging aspect for the CF and NGO relationship. In the case of the competitive nature of NGOs, some participants suggested that because competition for funding is so fierce amongst NGOs, successful movement toward anything which might hinder their edge in the competition, such as being seen collaborating with the CF, would be a challenge.

In terms of organizational structure, participants felt that even when efforts are made to bridge the gap between NGOs and the CF, the structure of the organization may stall the process. Role clarity was described by many as a key concern, where the CF hierarchy (i.e., the military rank structure) does not allow an NGO to have a voice in the system, even if that NGO member's opinion is solicited and respected. Participants suggested, however, that providing space for an NGO to have voice within the CF was a challenging prospect because it disrupts the chain of command and hence the identity of members of the CF. Timelines were also raised by participants as a potential barrier to an effective relationship. Short rotations influenced the CF's ability to sustain projects implemented and relationships built. However, some participants noted that CF short rotations and NGO skill at sustainability and longer mission times could potentially complement one another, with the CF providing security and influx of quick, much needed projects, while NGOs come in later, to implement and sustain humanitarian work, thus providing a form of exit strategy for the CF.

Another key theme that emerged was the lack of trust that NGOs have for the CF. As mentioned earlier, participants indicated that the formation of a relationship between NGOs and the CF is perceived by NGOs to compromise their neutrality and their reputation with the public, both local and at home in Canada. This, in turn, can affect their security and their image in the eyes of their donor, but most importantly, may compromise their mandates. The issue of trust has to do with suspicion surrounding CF motivations for forming a relationship, and with the fear that information passed from NGO to CF could be used for reasons which do not align with NGO values. Nonetheless, participants felt that the development of trust was essential for reasons of security, and that efforts should be made by the CF to build trust by developing CIMIC's capability, which would hence allow for the "right" people to bridge and effectively maintain these relationships.

As a means of addressing some of the concerns discussed within the interviews, participants themselves had several recommendations for improvement of the CF and NGO relationship. The main theme that emerged was, not surprisingly, the need for training and education. Participants suggested that at present neither the CF nor many NGOs provide training of significance on civil-

military cooperation, and hence do not reflect the reality of what soldiers and humanitarian workers are experiencing on the ground. They felt that education and training may allow for more effective interaction between the two types of organizations and for exposure through joint training, academic conferences, and opportunity for open dialogue. Several of the participants also recommended the development and implementation of a selection system for CIMIC officers and endorsed a full-time career-path for CIMIC officers, indicating that the development of CIMIC would improve the capability of the CF to bridge the military-civilian divide. Finally, participants endorsed flexible approaches to forming an effective relationship between the two types of organizations, suggesting that a "thinking outside the box" approach would allow for creative means of communication that did not compromise the values or mandates of either organization.

In short, findings from the interviews would suggest that the ever-changing nature of the complex environment faced by the military and humanitarians alike renders the CF and NGO missions inextricable (albeit often functioning sporadically), despite the seemingly conflicted natures of their respective values and mandates. This is in keeping with the current literature which suggests that the existence of the "humanitarian space" is in question and is shrinking to be replaced by a hybrid, shared space which is uncoordinated, changing, and at times made up of conflicting positions (Monaghan, 2007). Findings from participant interviews indicate that the NGO and CF relationship, although faced with constraints, is something that is already being facilitated through both formal and, most interestingly, informal means. There are instances where without compromising their respective values, mandates or doctrines, the respective players are navigating their own way through the new territory of this shared, hybrid space. While participants echo the oft heard concerns, barriers and stereotypes that one traditionally associates with the NGO and CF relationship, embedded within these interviews were examples of creative solutions, opportunity for dialogue, and recognition of change. While this relationship is still in its infancy, and participants struggled to articulate what the relationship between the military and humanitarians should look like, each participant in different ways acknowledged the importance of such a relationship. Although the description of the interaction discussed by participants is not what one might consider a traditional relationship, and not entirely in keeping with the fully integrated model espoused by JIMP, its development is perhaps the best answer to the growing, diversifying and increasingly complex needs of today's security operations.

4.2   Recommendations

While participants indicated that NGO and CF alike are starting to find their own way and create their own solutions in the ever-changing security environment, there are recommendations drawing from the above findings that might help them navigate and facilitate this process.

1. In order to support and develop the capability that CIMIC affords the CF, it is suggested that a full-time career path be considered for CIMIC.

CIMIC officers are the bridge between the CF and every civilian organization or group in the "outside world" with whom they wish to interact. They allow a voice within the CF for the other civilian partners in theatre. CIMIC officers have the capacity to build trust, manage relationships and maintain optics among other areas of expertise. While CIMIC officers are already in place and doing what they can with what they have, participants indicated that they would benefit greatly from a proper selection process, from training that reflects the flexibility required of their role, and from a sustainable career path that would allow them to

develop the role to its full potential. This would allow the CF to place the importance on the role of CIMIC that it so clearly warrants in the changing and increasingly complex security environment.

2. As female soldiers may have a unique role to play in bridging the relationship between the CF and NGOs, as well as the local public.

Given that the participation of the nation's women is recognized as a key factor in any country's sustainable development (Tamas, 2009) and that NGO participants within this study indicated they felt that they did not have a voice with the CF, in part due to gender differences between the two organizations, it may be a prudent course of action to place emphasis on developing female CIMIC officers within the CF with whom NGOs and the local public might be more likely to make contact. Endorsing and promoting gender equity in operations, and recognizing the advantage that a female CIMIC officer may have in initiating effective communication with NGOs and the local population, may go a long way in furthering the NGO and CF relationship.

3. Transparency (in as much as is possible) of CF motivations behind forming a relationship with NGOs could begin to build trusting relationships between the two communities.

One of the main barriers to an effective relationship between the CF and NGOs is the lack of trust outlined in the results. Participants indicated that this lack of trust stems in part from suspicion regarding the motivations of the CF. This is supported by the fact that trust does not seem to be an issue for participants when the military is performing tasks for which it is known and respected, such as protection. Transparency (in as much as is possible) of CF motivations behind forming a relationship with NGOs could begin to break down this barrier. For example, some participants described instances in theatre where NGOs have been quite surprised to learn that the CF do not want or need to take credit for development or humanitarian projects that they wish to support, be it through financial means, information sharing, or equipment sharing. Through transparency and the airing of "other agendas" (again, in as much as is possible), it may be possible to demonstrate the sincerity of the CF desire to support development and humanitarian aid. Once again, the development of well trained operators who can have frequent dialogue with the other players in theatre and build that trust is key to a sustainable model of an effective NGO-CF relationship.

4. Providing NGOs with a clear role in conjunction with CIMIC officers to increase communication and allow vital expertise of NGO members to be utilized.

Another problematic issue had to do with a lack of role clarity for NGOs who are attempting to communicate with and advise the CF. The relationship that the CF have with other players in the complex security environment is often about control, jockeying for power, and having voice. Some NGO members indicated that there is not often a space within the CF hierarchy for their voices to be heard, despite the fact that their presence is often requested by the CF, and despite the fact that they do feel that their opinions are respected and valued for their experience and knowledge. This issue was deemed by participants to be particularly problematic, as interfering with the chain of command is too disruptive to the identity of the general CF population and is unlikely to be well received. Yet NGOs have a wealth of information, connections, history and experience that the CF simply do not have in the

humanitarian world, and to be stalled by hierarchy is particularly frustrating to both sides. Role clarity within CIMIC, however, which is known for flexibility, may be a possibility. Providing NGOs with a clear role in conjunction with CIMIC officers would allow for a line of communication to the commanding officer, and the possibility of effecting real change.

5. Flexibility of interaction options, ranging from extremely limited contact through more consistent engagement, should be encouraged to best meet the needs of the specific NGO-CF needs and relationship.

There needs to be recognition that the relationship between the CF and NGOs is one that must be flexible and tailored to each different NGO according to their own unique requirements. While the idea of coordination with neutrality was put forth in this document, what that looks like would have to differ according to the needs of each NGO. In some cases, this might mean having contact only for the purposes of better avoiding one another. While this is a far cry from the integrated philosophy espoused by JIMP, we do have to walk before we can run. Speaking candidly, the present study suggests that an integrated response that NGOs and other development workers are willing to live with is likely not going to look like the philosophy as originally conceived. It is going to have to be flexible, tailored to the diversity of players in theatre, and able to be modified as per the NGO or other civilian group working with the CF. It will have to be based upon compromise and that requires flexibility from both parties. It will likely be a different kind of integration, one in which the CF will not be "driving the bus," but one of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

6. Further joint training and education options should be pursued.

As mentioned in the recommendations made by the participants themselves, further education and training on the topic of civil-military interaction offers a mode of increasing awareness, understanding, trust, and mutual respect between CF and NGO relationship. Education and training needs to better reflect the reality of what soldiers and humanitarian workers are experiencing on the ground. Multifunctional and multi-sector training which promotes operational awareness regarding the roles, mandates and doctrines of other organizations is needed to effect change (Meharg, 2009). Furthermore, joint education and training could not only allow for better awareness and preparedness for civil-military missions, it would also allow for exposure, which, as indicated in the results, is a key component to getting everyone "back to the table," despite their differences, so that they can work together toward a common goal. Drawing on classic social psychology, it may be that constructive, direct personal experience is enough for NGOs and CF to begin to develop positive attitudes toward one another.

7. Implementation of an annual national conference.

As suggested by one of the participants, it might be fruitful to consider the implementation of an annual national conference on neutral ground, funded by a neutral party (not the CF), examining Canadian involvement in both natural disaster and in conflict situations. The conference could be a window into areas of consensus as well as lack of consensus between the different Canadian players. Participants could include the CF, the NGO community, as well as various government departments such as the Department of National Defence (DND), CIDA, DFAIT, the Solicitor General, etcetera. Among other things, a yearly publication deriving from the proceedings could provide an ongoing yearly measure of what is happening with the evolving relationships in the ever changing complex security environment.

8. Development of CF Cultural Competence

Finally, it is critical to recognize the importance of understanding, assessing and developing CF cultural competence. Recently, the CF has begun to incorporate research on the concept of cultural competence into training and development (such as the edited book: *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, Davis, 2009). Cultural competence is a concept that has its origins in the sociological, anthropological and psychological literatures. It differs from other approaches to instilling cultural skills, such as cultural awareness, in that it functions as a process and is not something that can simply be developed overnight, for example, through pre-deployment training. Cultural competence is a practice that is built upon and improved over time, in which knowledge about individuals and groups is integrated and transformed into skills that allow an individual or organization to work effectively in culturally diverse situations (Cross, Bazron, Dennis, & Isaacs, 1989). As one participant indicated, there is a "fundamental issue in organizational culture that your power relationships and your cultural dynamics inside an organization are going to be reflected *at the boundary between the organization and its environment*." Self-assessment is a necessary characteristic of a culturally competent organization. Understanding the meanings made in CF discourses about culture is an important first step toward developing CF cultural competence. Research which focuses on understanding the discourses within and between the intercultural groups in the NGO and CF relationship can reveal a variety of important information, from the negative, such as disparities in understanding or unintentional prejudice, to the positive, such as potential avenues of communication. CF self-assessment will shed light on what is being reflected at the boundary between the CF and the complex security environment.

4.3 Future Research

Although there are likely numerous suggestions for future research that could stem from this study and others like it, for the sake of prioritizing research that could most effectively support the further development of effective relationships between the CF and NGOs, we have three suggestions.

First, given that this is a pilot study, a larger study based upon this pilot study, with a broader participant base, is recommended. Furthermore, while this pilot study revealed that we are starting to ask the right questions, we are asking them of only a small portion of the players currently working and interacting in theatre. NGOs may be an important component of the whole picture, but they are simply that, a component. Expanding the participant list to include a full complement of the players would allow for the "bigger picture" and further the understanding of the dynamics in theatre. Future studies could include a broader group encompassing organizations beyond NGOs, such as IOs and other government departments (OGDs) (e.g., the RCMP, DFAIT, CIDA), paid contractors, and other development groups, all of which are involved in the theatre of operations. Within the CF, a broader net should be cast to encompass individuals from all branches of the military, but in particular, those with experience in a PRT or DART, as well as CIMIC. Understanding what issues of CF organizational culture are systemic and which are localized will help in understanding what happens when others interact with the CF and may lead to the development of more effective training. Despite the fact that all of the participants indicated that the questions posed in the interview were excellent, and representative of topics in the CF and NGO relationship that need to be further explored, we also recommend the refinement of the questionnaire. Some questions were redundant, while others were improvised upon during

the interview in order to make them more meaningful. Additional questions regarding avenues of communication between the two groups, as well as regarding selection for CIMIC officers, and examples of functioning CF and NGO relationships, are recommended.

Second, as mentioned, participants described a pilot study underway that examines the efficacy of a full-time CIMIC career path within the CF. If not already in place, a series of longitudinal studies could derive from this pilot program, beginning with initial focus groups with these CIMIC officers that explore the benefits and challenges of a full-time CIMIC program, and concluding with a program evaluation mapping the effectiveness of the program over its first 5 years. Evaluation, specifically of the training implemented for the full-time CIMIC program, would also be prudent if not already built into the pilot program.

Third, while a full research program on CF cultural competence is recommended, it is suggested that future research begin with the generation of a comprehensive listing and analysis of all CF literature related to cultural competence, including administrative literature, practices, policies and training programs (such as cultural awareness programs and cultural diversity training). If the magnitude of the literature does not allow for analysis of the entire sample, then representative samples could be chosen for a systematic review and analysis. Grounded theory analysis, an inductive form of analysis that allows for the exploration of complex connections between variables/categories, facilitated through the use of qualitative software NVivo8, is recommended. The general goal of this analysis would be to understand the current state of CF discourse, program and policy regarding CF cultural competency, to identify aspects which need improvement, and those that are strengths. Providing the context within which current CF discourses on cultural competency exist could act as a foundation from which to proceed with further research and development on CF cultural competence.

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Annex A   Recruitment E-mail

Dear

We are looking for volunteers to participate in a study exploring the relationship between military with non-military organizations. The purpose of the study entitled, "The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces: A Pilot Study" is to increase understanding of the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations.

It has been brought to our attention that you have had some experience working in this capacity and might consider volunteering as a participant in this study. The study would involve a one-on-one, confidential interview lasting approximately 2 hours. If you are interested in participating and/or would like more information about this study, please respond to this e-mail and we will be in touch shortly.

Thank you for your consideration,

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tara.holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca   angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

Annex B   Information Letter

Dear Participant:

You are being asked to participate in a study exploring the relationship between military and non-military organizations. The purpose of the study, entitled "The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces: A Pilot Study**,**" is to increase our understanding of the current relationship between the Canadian Forces (CF) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and will be conducted through interviews with both military and non-military participants.

As you may be aware, in the years since the Cold War, the changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries increasingly taking on roles in humanitarian relief and reconstruction, a field traditionally belonging to civilian organizations. Tensions have been noted to arise when civilian and military personnel are concurrently involved in providing humanitarian aid in areas of crisis. While many theories regarding this tension exist, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective. The goal of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between the CF and NGOs, in terms of both positive and negative aspects, and to find ways to improve the relationship that meets the needs and goals of both groups.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 2 hours of your time to participate in a one-on-one interview. Interviews may be conducted over the phone or in person. As you can see from the attached interview guide, the questions will focus on organizational structure and culture, stereotypes and assumptions, the quality and nature of relationships, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, control of resources, definitions of success and time frames, and information control and sharing.

We recognize that participating in this study takes up your time. Although we cannot pay you for your time, we are able to give you a small remuneration for your time in the amount of $ 22.16 as authorized by the Department of National Defence.

The information that you provide in the interview is strictly confidential and in order to ensure the confidentiality of yourself and others, we ask that you do not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this interview. This acts as protection to you in the unlikely event of an Access of Information request. Please also note that your interview is covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify you personally cannot be released without your consent.

With your consent, the interview will be recorded and transcribed for analysis and will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the researchers involved with this or ensuing projects. Interviews will be provided with a code number rather than a name to ensure confidentiality. At no time will the content of your interview be made available to anyone outside of the research team. The same consideration will apply should you grant permission for the secondary use of data, and at no time will the content of your interview be made available to anyone outside of the subsequent team(s). Once your interview has been transcribed, you will be provided with a copy so that you may review the contents, point out any errors in the transcription, and indicate any aspects you feel might be indentifying characteristics. Any interview material used in the

write up of the final report or subsequent publications will have any and all identifying characteristics removed.

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic of discussion makes you feel uncomfortable, you should feel free to decline to answer. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached voluntary consent form, as well as the biographical data form and return them to the researchers listed below by fax or regular mail.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) has approved this study "Revised Protocol L-692A".
This research project has been coordinated through the DGMPRA Social Science Research Review Board, in accordance with CANFORGEN 198/08. Coordination
763/09 – N. The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Tara Holton, and the Co-Investigator, Dr. Angela Febbraro, whose contact information is listed below. You may also contact the chair of the HREC at DRDC Toronto, Dr. Jack Landolt, at Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or (416) 635-2120.

Sincerely,

Dr. Tara L. Holton
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1133 Sheppard Avenue West
P.O. Box 2000
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M3M 3B9
Tel: (416) 635-2000, Ext. 2101
Fax: (416) 635-2191
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Dr. Angela R. Febbraro
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M3M 3B9
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Fax: (416) 635-2191
E-mail:
Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

Annex C   Voluntary Consent Form

Voluntary Consent Form

Title: The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces: A Pilot Study
Principal Investigator: Dr. Tara L. Holton, Defence R&D Canada - Toronto
Co-Investigators: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada - Toronto; Dr. Emily-Ana Filardo, Defence R&D Canada - Toronto
Thrust: 12og01, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Command Thrust, PG2)

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate as a participant in the study "The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces: A Pilot Study" (Protocol #L-692A). I have read the information letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Tara L. Holton at 416-635-2000 Extension 2101, or Dr. Angela R. Febbraro at 416-635-2000 Extension 3120.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a single one-on-one personal interview lasting 2 hours, which will be tape-recorded only with my consent. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form. I understand that the tape-recorded interview will be transcribed, and that I will have an opportunity to read and comment on the transcription.

I have been told that risks associated with this research are minimal. However, if asked questions that make me feel uncomfortable, I may decline to answer and I may terminate my participation at any time. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto Investigators without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I have been told that I should not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this interview, as protection to me in the unlikely event of an Access of Information request. I have also been told that my interview is covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify me personally cannot be released without my consent.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation as a participant will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of $ 22.16.

Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of $500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, should it be required, I agree to allow the experimental data to be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

For Civilian Participants:

Participant's name: _____

Signature:_____

Date: _____

Name of Witness to Signature: _____

Signature: _____

Date:_____

For Canadian Forces (CF) members only: I understand that I am considered to be on duty for disciplinary, administrative and Pension Act purposes during my participation in this study. I also understand that I need to obtain the signed approval of my supervisor or Commanding Officer.

Participant's name: _____

Signature:_____

Date: _____

Name of Witness to Signature: _____

Signature: _____

Date:_____

Name of Commanding Officer:_____

Signature:_____

Date:_____

SECONDARY USE OF DATA:

I consent/do not consent (delete as appropriate) to the use of this study's experimental data involving me in unidentified form in future related studies provided that review and approval have been given by DRDC HREC.

Participant's Signature: _____ Date:_____

Name of Witness to Signature: _____

Signature: _____Date:_____

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada -Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Tara L. Holton, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2101, Tara.Holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

Annex D   Demographic Questionnaire (CF)

<u>Biographical Data Form</u>
<u>For Canadian Forces Participants</u>

1. Age: _____

2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Male

    ☐ Female

3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Single

    ☐ Married

    ☐ Divorced

    ☐ Widowed

    ☐ Common-Law

4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Some High School

    ☐ Completed High School

    ☐ Some College

    ☐ Completed College

    ☐ Some Trade School

    ☐ Completed Trade School

    ☐ Some University

    ☐ Completed Undergraduate Degree

    ☐ University Professional Degree

    ☐ Some Graduate Courses

    ☐ Master's Degree

☐ Doctorate

5. Did you graduate from a CF military college?   Y   N

6. Country of birth:_____

7. Heritage/ethnicity: _____

8. What uniform do you wear?   Army   Navy   Air   (please circle)

9. Number of years in the military:_____

10. Rank: _____

11. Current position : _____

12. Regular Force or Reserve Force (please circle)

13. Contact with NGOs in your work with the CF?   Y_____ N_____

14. Have you ever worked for a humanitarian or development agency? Y___ N___
    (if yes, please specify) _____

15. Deployments (overseas and domestic, including Op name, date and duration):

    _____
    _____
    _____

16. First language:

    ☐ English
    ☐ French
    ☐ Other (please specify)   _____

Annex E Demographic Questionnaire (NGO)

Biographical Data Form For NGO Participants

1. Age _____

2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Male

    ☐ Female

3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Single

    ☐ Married

    ☐ Divorced

    ☐ Widowed

    ☐ Common-Law

4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):

    ☐ Some High School

    ☐ Completed High School

    ☐ Some College

    ☐ Completed College

    ☐ Some Trade School

    ☐ Completed Trade School

    ☐ Some University

    ☐ Completed Undergraduate Degree

    ☐ University Professional Degree

    ☐ Some Graduate Courses

    ☐ Master's Degree

☐ Doctorate

5. Country of birth: _____

6. Heritage/ethnicity: _____

7. Number of years working for an NGO:_____

8. Names of NGO(s) worked for: _____

9. Current occupation with NGO : _____

10. Contact with the Canadian Forces or other military in your NGO work?
    Y_____ N_____

11. Have you ever served in the Canadian Forces or another military? Y_____ N_____
    (if yes, please specify)_____

12. NGO missions (overseas and domestic, purpose, organization, time and duration):
    _____
    _____
    _____
    _____

13. First language:

    ☐ English

    ☐ French

    ☐ Other (please specify)   _____

Annex F   Interview Questions (CF)

Interview Questions/Guide (Canadian Forces)

(Topic Categories, Sample Questions/Probes)

Introduction: Thank you for participating in this interview. I am going to ask you a series of questions about your thoughts regarding the relationship between the CF and NGOs. I will be tape recording our conversation for transcription purposes. All responses you provide will be confidential and anonymous. Please know that there are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to answer in as much detail as you would like.

Experiences in the Canadian Forces:

1. We'll start by talking about your military career. Please tell me a little bit about the history of your career, from the time you started to the present (prompts below):

   a. When and where did you enroll in the Canadian Forces?
   b. Where did you go from there? (occupation transfers, postings, promotions, current occupation and rank).
   c. What kind of training or education have you received through your work?
   d. Do you foresee yourself continuing in the Canadian Forces? Why/Why not?
   e. Have you ever had any contact with Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in your career with the Canadian Forces? If so, could you tell me about this/these experiences?
   f. Have you had any experiences working in CIMIC or as a member of PRT?
   g. Are there any other aspects of your career history you would like to share?

2. Tell me a bit about yourself (prompts below):

   a. Why did you originally choose to join the Canadian Forces?
   b. Are these the same reasons that you continue your work with the Canadian Forces? Please elaborate.
   c. Do you have training, background, or experience(s) that led you to this field of work?
   d. What aspects of working for the CF do you enjoy?
   e. Are there any aspects that you do not enjoy? What are some of those?
   f. What aspects of working for the CF do you find the most challenging? The least challenging?
   g. What is your perspective on military involvement in humanitarian assistance or development work?
   h. Other experience(s) or information about yourself that you would like to share that you feel may be relevant to your career in the Canadian Forces?

Organizational Perspectives

Let's talk now about the culture of NGOs and of the Canadian Forces (prompts below):

Note: May need a brief description of what is meant by 'culture' of an organization, as it is not always clear to people.

Definition of Organizational Culture: Organizational Culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration and that have worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1984, p. 4)

    a. How would you describe the general culture of the CF?
    b. How would you describe the general culture of NGOs?
    c. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF differ in terms of their values? If so, how?
    d. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF share any values? If so, which ones?
    e. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF differ in terms of their composition? (gender, age, ethnicity) If so, how?
    f. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF differ in terms of how they go about making decisions/solving problems? If so, how?
    g. Do NGOs and the CF have things in common in terms of how they make decisions/solve problems? If so, please describe.
    h. What about in terms of planning? Are there any similarities or differences between NGOs in general and the CF or the military in general?
    i. In general, how do you feel that the culture of NGOs and of the CF affects the relationships they have with one another?

Getting Work Done

Let's talk about how tasks in the humanitarian or development field get accomplished:

    a. In general, what do you feel is an NGO's motivation for the humanitarian or development work they do? Do you feel that most NGOs have a similar motivation?
    b. In general, what do you feel is the Canadian military's motivation for the humanitarian or (albeit short-term) development work they do?
    c. Do the CF and NGOs differ in the way that they go about accomplishing a task? If so, how? If not, please explain.
    d. How would you describe a 'successful mission' from the perspective of the CF?

e. How do you feel an NGO would describe a 'successful' mission?

f. From the perspective of the Canadian Forces, what do you feel is the biggest barrier or barriers to accomplishing a humanitarian mission or development work?

g. What do you feel can be done to overcome this barrier (or these barriers)?

h. Are there reasons why NGOs and the Canadian Forces might want to work together?

i. Are there reasons why NGOs and the Canadian Forces might NOT want to work together?

j. How do you feel about information sharing between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?

k. How do you feel about resource sharing between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?

l. Do you feel there is enough communication between NGOs and the CF 'on the ground'?

m. In your opinion, what works/doesn't work when NGOs and the CF work together to accomplish tasks, for instance, in a context like Afghanistan? Does it depend on the context?

n. In your opinion, what should be the respective roles of the CF and NGOs in accomplishing a task in humanitarian relief or development work?

Perceptions, Relationships and Cooperation

Let's talk a bit about your perceptions of the relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs (prompts below):

a. How do you feel that NGOs, in general, perceive the Canadian Forces?

b. How do you feel that the CF, in general, perceives NGOs?

c. Please describe, from your perspective, the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs, in general.

d. Could you also please describe the relationships among the various NGOs? How do these relationships differ from those between NGOs and the CF? Are there any similarities?

e. How do you feel about the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs, in general?

f. Did trust play a role (either positively or negatively) in your experience with NGOs and if so in your view how did it play a role?

g. What are the strengths and challenges of the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs?

h. Do you think it is necessary to improve military and NGO relations?

i. What do you think the relationship between NGOs and the Canadian Forces should involve? Why?

j. Do you think it is possible to improve military and NGO relations? Why or why not?

k. What would need to happen to improve the relationship between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?

l. What term would you use to describe the current, and ideal, relationship between the CF and NGOs – would you use the term coordination? Cooperation? Collaboration? How about integration?

m. How do you feel that the local population would perceive cooperation between the CF and NGOs on any given task?

n. Do you feel that the recipients of aid would benefit from NGO and military cooperation? Why/Why not?

o. Do you feel that the media plays a role in the relationship between NGOs and the CF?

p. Do you think it is advisable to further develop the military and NGO relationship? Note: Instead of the word 'relationship', could insert the word the participant chose earlier in question j. (coordination, collaboration, integration)? Why or why not?

Are there any other comments you would like to make?

Thank you for your time.

Annex G   Interview Questions (NGO)

Interview Questions/Guide (NGO)

(Topic Categories, Sample Questions/Probes)

Introduction: Thank you for participating in this interview. I am going to ask you a series of questions about your thoughts regarding your experience working for a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and about the relationship between the Canadian Forces (CF) and NGOs, and militaries and NGOs in general. I will be tape recording our conversation for transcription purposes. All responses that you provide will be confidential and anonymous. Please know that there are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to answer in as much detail as you would like.

General Background and Experiences working for an NGO

1. We'll start by talking about your career as a member of an NGO.

    a. How long have you been working in humanitarian relief? (or other type of humanitarian or development work).
    b. Tell me a bit about your career history.
    c. What kind of training or education have you received through your humanitarian/development work?
    d. What is your current occupation in the field?
    e. Do you volunteer in this field or is this your primary occupation? (If volunteer – do you have another occupation - and what is that occupation?).
    f.   Do you foresee yourself continuing in the humanitarian/development field? Why/Why not?
    g. Have you ever had any contact with the Canadian Forces or the military of other countries in your career in the humanitarian/development field? If so, could you tell me about this/these experiences?
    h. Are there any other aspects of your career history that you would like to share?

2. Tell me a bit about yourself (prompts below):

    a. Why did you originally choose to work in the humanitarian or development field?
    b. Are these the same reasons that you continue to work in this field? Please elaborate.
    c. Do you have training, background, or experience(s) that led you to this field of work?

d. If you volunteer, and if you have another occupation, do you feel that occupation has contributed to/distracted from your career in the humanitarian or development field?
e. What aspects of working in this field do you enjoy, and what aspects do you not enjoy?
f. What aspects of working in this field do you find the most challenging? The least challenging?
g. What is your perspective on military involvement in humanitarian or development efforts?
h. Other experience(s) or information about yourself that you would like to share that you feel is/are relevant to your career in humanitarian assistance?

Organizational Perspectives

Let's talk now about the culture of NGOs and of the CF (prompts below):

Note: May need a brief description of what is meant by 'culture' of an organization, as it is not always clear to people.

Definition of Organizational Culture: Organizational Culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration and that have worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1984, p. 4)

a. How would you describe the general culture of the NGO you work for? Of NGOs in general?
b. How would you describe the general culture of the Canadian Forces? Of militaries in general?
c. Do you feel that there are any differences between NGOs and the CF in terms of their values? If so, how?
d. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF share any values? If so, which ones?
e. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF differ in terms of their composition? (gender, age, ethnicity) If so, how?
f. Do you feel that NGOs and the CF differ in terms of how they go about making decisions/solving problems? If so, how?
g. Do NGOs and the CF have things in common in terms of how they make decisions/solve problems? If so, please describe.
h. What about in terms of planning? Are there any similarities or differences between NGOs in general and the CF or the military in general?
i. In general, how do you feel that the culture of NGOs and of the CF affects the relationships they have with one another?

Getting Work Done

Let's talk about how tasks in humanitarian relief and development field get accomplished:

    a. In general, what do you feel is an NGO's motivation for the humanitarian or development work they do? Do you think that most NGOs tend to have a similar motivation?

    b. In general, what do you feel is the Canadian military's motivation for the humanitarian or (albeit short-term) 'development' work they do?

    c. Do the CF and NGOs differ in the way that they go about accomplishing a task? If so, how? If not, please explain.

    d. How would you describe a 'successful mission' from the perspective of an NGO?

    e. How do you feel the Canadian Forces would describe a 'successful' mission?

    f. What do you feel is the biggest barrier or barriers to accomplishing a humanitarian mission or development work?

    g. What do you feel can be done to overcome this barrier?

    h. Are there reasons why NGOs and the Canadian Forces might want to work together?

    i. Are there reasons why NGOs and the Canadian Forces might NOT want to work together?

    j. How do you feel about information sharing between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?

    k. How do you feel about resource sharing between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?

    l. Do you feel there is enough communication between NGOs and the CF 'on the ground'? Between NGOs and other NGOs?

    m. In your opinion, what works/doesn't work when NGOs and the CF work together to accomplish tasks, for instance, in a context like Afghanistan? Does it depend on the context?

    n. In your opinion, what should be the respective roles of the CF and NGOs in accomplishing a humanitarian or development task?

Perceptions, Relationships and Cooperation

Let's talk a bit about your perceptions of the relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs (prompts below):

    a. How do you feel that NGOs perceive the military?

    b. How do you feel that the military perceives NGOs?

    c. Please describe from your perspective, the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs.

d. Could you also please describe the relationships among the various NGOs? How do these relationships differ from those between NGOs and the CF? Are there any similarities?
e. How do you feel about the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs?
f. Did trust play a role (either positively or negatively) in your experience with the military and if so in your view how did it play a role?
g. Do you think it is necessary to improve military and NGO relations?
h. What are the strengths and challenges of the current relationship between the Canadian Forces and NGOs?
i. What do you think the relationship between NGOs and the Canadian Forces should involve? Why?
j. Do you think it is possible to improve military and NGO relations? Why or why not?
k. What would need to happen to improve the relationship between NGOs and the Canadian Forces?
l. What term would you use to describe the current, and ideal, relationship between the CF and NGOs – would you use the term coordination? Cooperation? Collaboration? How about integration?
m. How do you feel that the local population would perceive cooperation between the CF and NGOs on any given task?
n. Do you feel that the recipients of aid would benefit from NGO military cooperation? Why/Why not?
o. Do you feel that the media plays a role in the relationship between NGOs and the CF? Explain?
p. Do you think it is advisable to further develop a military and NGO relationship? (Note: Or instead of 'relationship,' could insert the word the participant chose in question j.) Why or why not?

Are there any other comments you would like to make?

Thank you for your time.

Annex H   Transcription Guide

<u>Transcription Coding</u>

- Write the title of the interview (WS31404: Interview # 74)

- Times New Roman size 12 font

- In general: we are writing down the words verbatim, including noises and pauses, and intonation remarks where possible. Ex. "Ooohh (intrigued)."

- On a new line write down the time every few paragraphs.

- Single space within one speaker, double space between speakers

    - Speaker 1: I really like working at DRDC! The people in CPL are so nice and we get to do cool research projects.

      Speaker 2: Yeah I know! Who would want to work anywhere else! I love when people bake things and put them in the kitchen! Woohoo!

      Speaker 1: Let's go have some coffee.

- Set the Left Indent tab to 0.5 inches and keep the First Line Indent where it is (at 0). Each time you start a new line for a new speaker, hit tab so that it begins at 0.5 inches. Every line after that for the same speaker should begin at 0.5 inches without needing to hit tab again. Use "I" for the interviewer and "R" for the respondent.

- To indicate that someone is dragging a word (most commonly it is "um"), write the word and then the amount of time it is held for in brackets

    - The dog chased the cat around the ummmm (held 1:03-1:07) block, then ran hooome (held 1:12-1:17) to eat his dinner.

- To indicate raised intonation in a word, use the ^ symbol.

    - S1: What did you like about the job?

      S2: It's really been a pleasure to work in that type of environment, and have that kind of decision making power^. It's nice not to

have bureaucracy get in the way.

- o To indicate a drop, use this symbol in the same fashion: ↓

- Whenever there is a pause, indicate the time from beginning-end of pause

  - o What do all women love? All women love (pause 5:13-5:25) chocolate.

- If a speaker interrupts another: i) put "…" at the point of interruption by the first speaker ii) put the second speaker's speech on a new line iii) continue with the rest of the first speaker's speech on the next line, beginning with "…"

  S1: I love going on amusement park rides! The only thing is…

  S2: They make you sick?

  S1: …that yeah, they make me feel ill.

If a second speaker interrupts with an "okay," "uh-huh," "yes" etc., use the proceeding example to avoid breaking the primary speaker's speech unit

  S1: Okay, so I am still officially in graduate school a.k.a. "a student" (S2: okay) but I came to work at DRDC in order to have the experience of doing research outside of the University locale (S2: yes) in an applied setting… to get a sense of what work outside of academia looks and feels like and I am very glad to be here!

In the preceding example instead of moving the second speaker's utterance to a second line, I have just indicated it in rounded parentheses (rounded brackets)

- If there is overlap/both people talking at the same time, use square brackets for the parts of speech where there is overlap

  - S1: I went to the park [today, but I] didn't go on the swings.

    S2: [Central Park?]

    S1: No, Parkview [Park]

    S2: [Oh okay]. Why didn't you swing?

    S1: There were too many children around. I feel uncomfortable going on the swings when it's very busy. I like to swing peacefully by myself.

In this example, "today but I" and "Central Park" were spoken at the same time, and "Park" and "Oh okay" were spoken at the same time. They are colour coded accordingly. The speech continues normally after that.

- If a part of speech is ambiguous, use round brackets and indicate the time/duration of the words you cannot hear preceded by the word something. If you have a guess, put the guess in followed by a question mark before the time. If after review by others the speech remains unclear, the word "inaudible" will be used in place of "something"

  - We went to the circus and saw tigers, elephants, bears, (seals? – 10:23-10:24), and even some acrobats (something – 10:28-10:31) trapeze.

- To indicate emphasis on a word, use italics

  - He was doing a great job, a *really* great job.

- To indicate laughter or to qualify the way something was said, use round brackets (laughter).

- If a phrase or a few lines sound like one thing but could be another, and you want the reviewer to note that you may not have been 100% accurate, I have been putting that in bold

  - I went out for lunch today and ate like a pig. I had so many different types of food at the buffet, **some I'm not sure I even know** the name of.

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List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

ARP: Applied Research Project

CARE: Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CF: Canadian Forces

CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency

CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation

DART: Disaster Assistance Response Team

DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

DND: Department of National Defence

DRDC: Defence Research & Development Canada

HREC: Human Research Ethics Committee

IED: Improvised Explosive Device

IO: International Organization

JIMP: Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public

LAV: Light Armored Vehicle

NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

OGD: Other Government Department

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team

RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RMC: Royal Military College

SME: Subject Matter Expert

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

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(U) The Canadian Forces (CF) is adopting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to operations (i.e., joint, interagency, multinational, public, or JIMP). Of the JIMP dimensions, the "public" aspects, which include non–governmental organizations (NGOs), may pose some of the greatest challenges in terms of interacting with non–military players. While many theories regarding these tensions exist, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective, and few studies have examined the potentially positive aspects of the military–NGO relationship. The purpose of this pilot study was to begin to explore the perspectives of NGO workers and CF members on the relationship between NGOs and the CF, in particular as it pertains to their collaboration in theatre. Participants included 5 members of NGOs, 5 CF members and one additional Subject Matter Expert for a total of 11 participants. Interviews were each approximately 2 hours in length, were tape recorded (with consent) using digital recording equipment, and subsequently transcribed. Content analysis was conducted using conventional qualitative data–analytical tools and techniques. Specifically, NVivo8, a qualitative research software package, was used to identify and categorize themes and issues pertaining to specific interview questions as well as themes and issues that emerged from the interviews. Main themes which emerged from the data include: participant perceptions of the relationship between the CF and NGOs; the role and direction that Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) should be taking; the importance of managing optics; differences in organizational culture and structure; the lack of trust between the two organizations; and recommendations for training and education. Findings show that despite organizational differences, as well as concerns with trust and image and a lack of institutional support, participants from both organizations acknowledge that the NGO and CF relationship is in many cases inevitable, in some cases a necessity, and often, already in place and working effectively through both formal and informal means. Some of the recommendations made include: the further development of CIMIC; the use of joint training, education and conferences for NGOs and the CF as a means of fostering exposure and functional relationships; and the assessment of CF cultural competence.

(U) Les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont décidé d'adopter une approche plus coordonnée et mieux intégrée pour la gestion des opérations (cadre interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public, ou IIMP). L'aspect « public » du cadre IIMP, qui comprend les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), risque de créer de sérieux problèmes aux FC en termes d'interaction avec les joueurs non militaires. Bien qu'il existe de nombreuses théories à ce sujet, peu d'études ont examiné la question à fond dans une perspective canadienne, et peu d'études ont examiné les aspects potentiellement positifs de la relation FC ONG. Le but de la présente étude pilote était de commencer à explorer le point de vue des employés des ONG, et celui des membres des FC, sur la relation FC ONG, notamment en ce qui concerne leur collaboration dans les théâtres d'opérations. Ont participé à l'étude : 5 représentants des ONG, 5 membres des FC et un spécialiste du domaine, pour un total de 11 participants. Les entrevues ont duré environ deux heures chacune, elles ont été enregistrées (avec le consentement des intéressés) au moyen d'équipements numériques, et elles ont fait l'objet d'une transcription par la suite. Le contenu a été analysé au moyen d'outils et de techniques conventionnelles d'analyse des données qualitatives. En particulier, NVivo8, un logiciel de recherche qualitative, a été utilisé pour identifier et catégoriser les thèmes et les sujets abordés dans certaines questions d'entrevue, ainsi que les thèmes et les sujets qui ont émergé pendant les

entrevues. Les principaux thèmes qui ont émergé pendant les entrevues sont les suivants : la perception par les participants de la relation FC ONG; le rôle de la coopération civilo militaire (COCIM) et l'orientation qu'il faudrait lui donner; l'importance de gérer les différentes optiques; les différences de culture et de structure organisationnelle; le manque de confiance entre les FC et les ONG; et diverses recommandations relatives à la formation et à l'éducation. Les conclusions de l'étude montrent que malgré les différences de structure organisationnelle, les inquiétudes suscitées par le manque de confiance et l'absence de soutien institutionnel, les représentants des ONG et des FC reconnaissent que la relation FC ONG est dans bien des cas inévitable, parfois nécessaire, et souvent déjà en place et parfaitement efficace, grâce à des moyens formels et informels. Voici certaines des recommandations qui ont été formulées dans le cadre de l'étude : développer davantage la COCIM; recourir à des séances de formation/éducation et à des conférences pour promouvoir les relations fonctionnelles entre les ONG et les FC; et évaluer les compétences culturelles des FC.

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(U) NGO, CF, CIMIC, JIMP, Organizational Culture, Humanitarian, Development, Content Analysis

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